Decision-Making Considerations and Practical Constraints

As the U.S. midterm elections approach, the Iran issue is becoming a difficult test for the Trump administration. Trump had previously pledged not to attack Iran before the midterm election, but on October 23 he said he would not rule out another round of military action. This shift reflects the dilemma facing the White House. On the one hand, further military action against Iran that draws the United States into a prolonged conflict would increase military costs, casualties, and volatility in energy markets, all of which would intensify domestic political pressure and erode the Republican Party’s electoral support. On the other hand, accepting a ceasefire or compromise before achieving its stated strategic objectives could expose Trump to domestic criticism of his decision-making ability, the effectiveness of his military campaign, and his ability to deter adversaries. The midterms thus have a dual effect on U.S. policy toward Iran: they raise the political cost of further military action, but they may also encourage the administration to use military pressure to break the negotiating impasse and secure more favorable terms.

Considerations Driving Military Action Against Iran

Pressure to preserve his credibility as president may be an important factor in Trump’s consideration of further military action. Trump has repeatedly claimed that the campaign against Iran is making progress, even linking its achievements to his own leadership. Policy toward Iran has therefore become more than a foreign policy and security issue; it also bears on his personal political reputation. Ali Vaez, Deputy Program Director with the International Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa program, has argued that Trump believes appearing ineffectual on Iran could carry a greater political cost than going to war. As the impasse persists, the costs of war mount, and the administration’s stated objectives remain unmet, the White House will face growing pressure both to explain the necessity of military action to the American public and to answer opposition criticism of its alleged misjudgments. Against this backdrop, some in Washington have advocated another show of force to break the deadlock, gain negotiating leverage, and help Trump shape a more favorable political narrative ahead of the midterms. Some within the White House may also believe that further strikes would increase pressure on Iran and compel it to make concessions at the negotiating table. Military escalation may therefore be seen not only as a means of achieving strategic objectives in Iran, but also as an option for Trump to restore his credibility as president and reduce domestic political risk.

Support from the Republican base also leaves political room for such a choice. A Pew Research Center survey released on October 8 found that 65 percent of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents believed the initial U.S. decision to use force against Iran was right, while 63 percent approved of Trump’s handling of the conflict. Support for the initial decision had fallen from 71 percent in March, indicating some erosion within the Republican camp, but a majority of respondents in that camp still supported the administration’s earlier decision. These views leave the White House some political room to take a hard line, but they do not establish that Republican voters would support extending the conflict indefinitely. As the war continues and its economic costs accumulate, it remains uncertain whether approval of the initial decision to use force will translate into support for further escalation.

The potential shift in the balance of power in Congress after the midterms will also influence when Trump chooses to take military action against Iran. Before the election, the economic burdens, casualties, and public backlash associated with a continuing war could hurt Republican electoral prospects, prompting the White House to weigh the political costs of escalation carefully. Looking beyond the election, however, if Democrats gain greater influence in Congress, the administration could face more political resistance to its Iran policy, particularly over oversight of military spending and decisions on military action. With Republican electoral prospects under pressure, Trump and his advisers may face a dilemma over timing: further military action before the election carries political risks, while action afterward could face greater congressional constraints. Whether the White House can break the negotiating impasse with Iran and secure some interim gains before the election may therefore become an important consideration as it weighs its options.

Meanwhile, threats to the safety of U.S. personnel could provide further political impetus for a tougher policy toward Iran. On October 23, Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a memorandum that Tehran's plots to carry out deadly attacks against U.S. citizens were showing signs of further escalation in the Middle East and elsewhere. The warning came as the U.S. government was assessing staffing and security arrangements at several diplomatic missions in the Middle East. If U.S. personnel were attacked, the White House could face pressure from Congress, the media, and the public to respond more forcefully. With the midterms approaching, political opponents might also use such an incident to question the administration’s ability to protect U.S. citizens. Security threats are therefore not only a practical factor in military decision-making; they may also translate into domestic political pressure, prompting the administration to strengthen deterrence against Iran and even consider military strikes as a possible response.

Practical Constraints on Military Action Against Iran

Domestic economic pressures pose a direct constraint on the White House ahead of the midterm elections. Midterm elections have long served as an interim assessment of the incumbent president and the administration’s performance, with economic conditions often a decisive factor in voters’ judgments. The classic Clinton campaign slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid,” captures voters’ primary concern with how policies affect their own lives, rather than with an administration’s military achievements. The continuing war with Iran not only entails direct military spending but also increases living costs for ordinary American households through higher energy prices. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that operations against Iran had cost the Department of Defense about $38 billion as of August 1, with each additional month costing roughly $2 billion even if the conflict remains at a low intensity. An Associated Press poll released on October 22 found that around eight in ten registered voters wanted the next Congress to prioritize the cost of living, while roughly seven in ten respondents believed the Iran war had pushed living costs higher. As the midterms approach, even if the White House can claim some military gains, these may not be enough to offset voters’ frustration with rising fuel prices and living costs. If another round of strikes fails to improve shipping conditions in the Strait of Hormuz and ease pressure on energy supplies, and instead triggers further retaliation and pushes oil prices higher, the administration could face criticism both for mounting war costs and for its management of the economy. The risk that further military escalation could worsen the domestic economic outlook is therefore a political constraint Trump cannot escape when considering military action against Iran before the election.

Public concern about U.S. casualties and a prolonged war also raises the political threshold for further military action. Pew Research Center polling shows that 65 percent of U.S. adults disapprove of Trump’s handling of the Iran conflict, while 71 percent are highly concerned about U.S. military casualties. The White House must not only explain why further strikes are necessary, but also address whether they can achieve objectives that have so far remained out of reach, and how it intends to avoid escalation and further casualties. If a new round of strikes triggers Iranian retaliation and forces the United States to deploy more troops, it could deepen public concern that the war is spiraling out of control. A public desire to end the war does not amount to opposition to all military action. But if the administration seeks to bring the war to an end through further strikes, it must demonstrate that escalation can deliver concrete results rather than prolong the conflict and increase its costs.

Divisions within the Republican Party are another political constraint on military action against Iran before the election. Although Trump’s core supporters broadly back his hard line on Iran, rising costs and a protracted conflict are widening divisions between MAGA and non-MAGA Republicans, while also drawing open criticism from opponents of overseas intervention within the MAGA camp. As the midterms approach, Republican candidates in competitive races must appeal to antiwar independent voters while retaining the backing of Trump’s supporters, making their political balancing act more difficult. A Reuters analysis found that around two-thirds of Republican candidates in competitive House and Senate races had distanced themselves from Trump or played down their ties to him. This trend suggests that renewed military action before the election could not only intensify disputes over the party’s direction but also weaken the White House’s ability to secure Republican support in Congress.

The central dilemma in U.S. policy toward Iran is the gap between the pressure to deliver short-term political gains and the capacity to sustain a long-term military commitment. Domestic pressure demands that the White House break the deadlock quickly while making it difficult to accept a compromise that could be seen as weakness. This may increase the incentive to seek a breakthrough through limited military escalation. Yet a limited operation does not mean the conflict can be kept under control. Its duration and ultimate course will still depend on Iran’s response and subsequent interactions between the two sides, rather than on Washington’s plans alone. The midterms may influence when and how Trump takes risks, but they cannot close the gap between military means and political objectives. The real danger is that the White House may mistake the need to ease domestic political pressure for grounds to believe that military escalation would succeed. If strikes fail to produce the expected results, pressure to preserve deterrence and political credibility could then push the United States to escalate further, turning an operation intended to break the deadlock into a costly, prolonged conflict that would be increasingly difficult to exit.

 Jodie Wen is a fellow at Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), Tsinghua University. Her research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and the Middle East. She is the author of U.S. Middle East Policy (2009–2017).