I recently traveled to Washington D.C. and New York, where I held in-depth discussions with a range of American counterparts from the strategic, academic and business communities on China-U.S. relations. These conversations gave me a more nuanced and layered understanding of both the current dynamics and the potential trajectory of bilateral ties in the next phase.
One of my key takeaways is that while there is broad consensus within the Trump administration on the strategic competition with China, the approach to China is highly personalized and transactional without a long-term strategy. Different factions and voices within the U.S. government are actively competing to shape the president’s perceptions of China, resulting in a policy-making process marked by uncertainties.
The most pressing issue on the minds of strategic thinkers in both countries is the future of the bilateral economic relationship, especially how the tariff war might shape broader dynamics. Once seen as the ballast of the relationship, trade and economics have now become one of its most destabilizing elements. Trump regards tariffs as a long-term strategic tool, not merely a short-term bargaining chip.
Still, Trump’s tariff strategy cannot escape the constraints of domestic economic and political realities. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has already warned that Trump’s tariff policies could push up inflation risks. Once the inflationary impact of tariffs begins to bite and voter dissatisfaction rises—likely in the fall—Trump may be compelled to adjust his trade stance.
Meanwhile, China appears to be playing a relatively proactive role in the ongoing talks. Some U.S. observers argue that China has figured out the key to dealing with Trump: rather than trying to interpret his inconsistent policies, it is more effective to analyze his behavioral patterns and political motives. The U.S. wavers across multiple issues, from tariffs and fentanyl to export controls and tech restrictions, without a clearly defined order of priority. This multi-issue bundling offers Trump greater room to declare victory. However, it makes it harder for the two sides to reach substantive agreements, particularly on tariffs.
I was also struck by the intense attention the fentanyl issue is receiving in Washington. The suffering fentanyl has caused in the U.S. is understandable, but emotion alone will not resolve it. Many in the U.S. are puzzled: they say the U.S. government has laid out specific expectations for China, yet at the same time, they insist that China should not link progress on fentanyl with reductions in tariffs.
From China’s perspective, this is also puzzling. After all, it was the Trump administration that first linked fentanyl cooperation to tariffs. It now seems contradictory for Washington to maintain high tariffs while expecting unconditional cooperation on narcotics control. At a deeper level, China believes that the root causes of America’s fentanyl crisis lie in domestic regulatory and social failures. China can be a partner in addressing the issue, but it should not be made the scapegoat.
What’s needed is not more moral accusations or political pressure, but concrete mechanisms for cooperation—real-time coordination between law enforcement agencies, data and intelligence sharing, and joint monitoring efforts. Above all, the two sides should not get stuck in an endless debate over “who moves first”. If the U.S. insists on keeping fentanyl policy entangled with 20% tariffs, it will only discourage China from moving forward. Conversely, if China demands tariff reductions while the U.S. remains unresponsive to incremental Chinese policies, viewing them as overdue actions rather than goodwill, the deadlock will persist.
Another area increasingly tied to the tariff discussion is export controls. Washington is wary that China might weaponize rare earth exports or supply chain leverage to push back against U.S. tech restrictions or tariff policies. Although some voices within the U.S. suggest a trade-off—relaxing certain export controls in exchange for stable Chinese supply of critical materials, this logic has not yet been institutionalized and faces strong opposition from economic “decouplers”.
What also struck me during this visit was the relatively pragmatic attitude of the American business community. For some U.S. companies, their primary concern is not market access per se, but the potential risk of being forced to withdraw from the Chinese market because of escalating tensions. The immediate priority for most of them is not expansion, but preventing further deterioration in bilateral relations that could jeopardize their current operations.
From them, the supply chain “diversification” strategy promoted by the Trump administration is more of a risk-hedging move than a push for full-scale decoupling. Still some companies do not want to see the U.S. and China economies fully separated. It is in the interest of both governments to listen to these rational and pragmatic voices—they are the ones truly invested in long-term stability.
Another area of concern is people-to-people exchange. While Trump has stated that he welcomes Chinese students, some of his senior officials have pushed for stricter visa policies. This policy contradiction reflects a troubling trend: educational and cultural exchange could once again fall victim to broader political and economic tensions, weakening the social foundation of the relationship. The silver lining, however, is that nearly every American counterpart I spoke with welcomed sustained dialogue at the scholarly level.
Both sides should take practical steps to stabilize the relationship. First, institutionalizing regular presidential dialogue should be a priority, regardless of fluctuations in the bilateral relationship. The upcoming APEC summit in South Korea this fall could serve as a key opportunity for a bilateral meeting or even a Trump visit to China, providing a platform for direct discussions on trade, tariffs, and fentanyl. Second, the two sides should establish technical working groups on key issues such as fentanyl, macroeconomic coordination, and artificial intelligence. Expanding track 1.5 and track 2 dialogues will also be crucial for maintaining communication momentum and developing policy options.