by Cliff Kupchan
The current international system is one of emerging bipolarity. That is good news, as bipolar systems tend to be peaceful. But risks in the US-China relationship and the system will be profound, focusing mostly on the economic and diplomatic arenas.
We are in a period of emerging bipolarity because the United States and China will be the world’s superpowers for the foreseeable future. The global distribution of power determines the nature of any system. The two nations have emerged over the past decade as the clear leaders on the most important indices of power – military and economic. The US retains a large advantage over China in the military realm. The two are much closer in the economic sphere. Clearly separating the US and China from the rest, the number 3 county on both military and economic power lies far below China. There are specific, structural, and enduring reasons for their rankings that will not change because of COVID or for any other foreseeable reason. For examples, the US has an extremely strong financial system, while China has a very innovative population.
Emerging bipolarity has several key characteristics, all of which are central to challenges and tensions in the new international order. First, the system will be relatively stable, or peaceful. Bipolar orders are more stable than the multipolar future that most observers foresee because bipolarity increases predictability and transparency in balancing.
Related, balancing between the US and China will take place primarily in the economic realm, where the two nations are closer to parity. Balancing will be much less intense in the military realm, where China will be deterred by US power. Economic balancing is safer than military balancing.
Turning briefly to COVID – ironically, COVID makes peace more likely. Covid will cause elites to be more pessimistic about the all-important question concerning war – “will I win?” Leaders know their country is weaker and do not know how the country will endure a war. Wars between states will be less common for as long as leaders are worried about this and a possible next pandemic.
The second key aspect of emerging bipolarity pertains to public goods, or the global commons. The provision of public goods will decline under emerging bipolarity because of diminished international leadership, but probably not by as much as most analysts believe.
Bipolar systems induce a desire by both superpowers to maintain the order, leading to some cooperation. We saw this dynamic during the Cold War. US and Chinese policy makers should study and replicate the compartmentalization of policy that the US and the Soviet Union showed during the Cold War. Both sides exhibited a political culture in which extreme competition was put aside for arms control negotiations. A good example occurred in 1972, when the US mined Haiphong harbor just as the SALT-1 agreement was signed. On the critical issue of compartmentalization, academic conferences and track 1.5s can be useful in socializing this practice into US-China relations. An urgent issue for focus is upgrading the US-China hotline. Clear protocols surrounding its use need to be developed.
Regarding war and peace, and public goods, there is reason for optimism.
Third and on the pessimistic side, emerging bipolarity causes and strengthens ongoing decoupling and fragmentation of the international system. Sharp economic balancing was the primary cause of decoupling in the high-tech arena – as both sides jockey for leadership in the digital economy.
What is new is decoupling 2.0 – the second wave, of which both bipolarity and COVID are important drivers. This round will involve global trade, not just US-China trade, as all nations seek to become more independent. Health care, data, and tourism are the sectors that will likely be affected.
Decoupling does mean that somewhat less interdependence will exist between nations in general and the US and China in particular. But contrary to consensus, that does not mean that war will become more likely. Political science tells us that interdependence does not correlate with peace but is indeterminate in its effect on stability.
The final key trait of emerging bipolarity is spheres of influence. Nobody likes spheres of influence, but they are a fact of life. With an uneven distribution of capabilities comes spheres of influence. Managing US-China competition for influence in all areas will be a key task that requires new mechanisms. Academics should focus on helping develop new, regional security structures.
A common US-China vision of this macro system is very possible. In fact, the vision is almost obvious – emerging bipolarity. Fortunately, the bipolarity model for US-China relations is gaining acceptance in both the US and China. Sometimes, analysts and policymakers respond: “no, we do not support bipolarity.” But the international system is like gravity, it is not about choice. -- The risk is that the sides will not recognize the system, which would detract from its efficiency.
This is not a new Cold War. The attributes of the new system are very different from the Cold War. Economic drivers are currently much more important than military ones, which dominated during the earlier period of bipolarity. Alliances are currently less ideological and more flexible. Related, middle powers and regional groupings have more freedom to maneuver This was clearly demonstrated when the EU and China signed the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment in December of 2020. Emerging bipolarity features a greater role for non-state actors than did the Cold War. Finally, cyber competition is a new characteristic.
To conclude, we need not so fear the near-term advent of a weak international system and great power competition. Emerging bipolarity will lead to both challenges and welcome structure.
Cliff Kupchan is chairman and director of research at Eurasia Group
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