（June 17, 2020, 10:19, Source: China News Weekly）
China-US relations after the COVID-19 outbreak
In February 2020, some Chinese scholars and I participated in the 56th Munich Security Conference in Germany. The theme of the conference was "Westlessness," which, from a European perspective, dwelt on whether "the West" was declining as the most important geopolitical center after the end of the First World War. This theoretical issue with a historical depth triggered heated discussions among the participants, but still, it was overshadowed by the existing contradictions between China and the United States .
At the time, China was working hard to control the outbreak of COVID-19. However, the American politicians who attended the conference were totally uninterested in these discussions or information about the epidemic. Instead, they preferred to focus their criticisms against China on issues ranging from Huawei 5G to Hong Kong and Xinjiang. They strongly demanded that the Europeans stood with them to form a unified Western position that is in strategic competition with China. The American delegation was impressive for its high power. It included House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and more than 20 senators and congressmen, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Kelly Kraft, and former Secretary of State John Kerry, along with senior officials and think tank scholars. They had apparently coordinated the positions of both the Republican and Democratic parties to highlight "the threat of China's rise" as the main topic for their attendance of the conference, and vilified Huawei products by saying they were "Trojan horses placed in the West by the Chinese intelligence system." They accused China of pursuing a "coercive maritime policy," using military and diplomatic forces to provoke other countries. At the same time, they declared that "the West is not in decline" and that "Western values will defeat the Russian and Chinese aspirations for an 'empire,'" and insisted that Europe and the United States must work together to respond to the "increasingly offensive nature of the Chinese Communist Party."
These tough statements echoed the adjustments made in the US’s China policy since Trump took office, which saw China as their primary "strategic competitor." Over the past three years, the US has successively launched trade war, high-tech war, and publicity campaign against China. It has increased military deployments targeting China, questioned China's political system and attacked the Chinese Communist Party. The continuous provocation of the US has forced China to respond and take countermeasures, which led to a rapid downward slide of China-US relations.
China’s forward and the US’s regressive movement
Observing the changes in US policy, one cannot fail to take notice of the evolution in the different basic lines of China and the United States after the Cold War.
China saw the future of the world as moving toward peace and development. It has followed this path, while continuing its reform and opening-up, and has concentrated on economic development. Entering the second decade of the 21st century, China has grown into the world's second-largest economy and built a global cooperation network. It has also increased its participation and influence in world affairs.
The United States, on the other hand, has indulged in the “end of history” and a belief in a unipolar world order. It has launched many wars, attempted to bend and transform other countries to its will and desired model. In doing so, it has over-stretched its hegemonic power. In addition, the lack of proper oversight over movements of capital propelled by economic globalization led to the 2008 financial crisis. Divisions have grown in the United States, as the uneven distribution of wealth has undermined the quality of life of the middle and lower classes, and the conflicting identity awareness have widened social gaps and polarized political interests. In recent years, a degree of self-reflection has emerged in American society, with a considerable number of people now realizing that the country's policies and path have not been successful. The Trump administration simply abandoned liberal internationalist policies, and promoted conservatism and “America first” policies. The US hegemony is in retrenchment, the “lighthouse effect” has dimmed accordingly.
The respective forward and regressive movements in China and the US reflect the different evolutionary trajectories of two countries in the same international system and has inevitably brought about tensions in the international power structure.
On the one hand, the United States needs to solve the problems that have been accumulated through its mistakes over the years in domestic and foreign policies. On the other, it has become increasingly unsettled by China and is trying to roll back its rise. The changes in US policies and attitudes have added new uncertainties to the international situation. The US is worried that China will compete with it for primacy in the world and sees competition with China as a battle to protect its fundamental interests, a battle it cannot afford to lose. The American hawks intend to push relations with China toward full-scale confrontation, believing that this is the only way to discontinue China’s advancement. Their abilities to mobilize and influence are growing. The US military has been upgrading its military deployments in the Western Pacific and Eastern Indian Oceans, strengthening its alliance networks, and advancing the "Indo-Pacific strategy." It has put its focus on the South China Sea and Taiwan to buttress its balance against China.
The other countries in the world are worried: Will China and the United States fall eyes-closed into the "Thucydides Trap," which predicts that the current dominant power and the rising power will inevitably come into conflict? Will the existing framework of multilateral global cooperation split or even collapse as a result?
It now appears that the scenes played out at the 2020 Munich Security Conference signaled that China-US relations would accelerate in decline in the course of the year.
Keywords in US Strategy Toward China: "Principled Realism"
Not long after the Munich Security Conference, the COVID-19 epidemic began to spread globally. In early April, the World Health Organization announced that the United States became the new "epicenter" of the "global pandemic" .This pandemic is the third major event that has changed the world’s agenda since the beginning of the 21st century. The first two were the "9/11" incident in 2001 and the global financial crisis in 2008, which plunged the United States into serious difficulties. During the financial crisis, in particular, countries around the world gave their full support and worked with the United States to overcome the difficulties. However, this time, the United States did not send any signal for solidarity and cooperation at the global level; instead, it showed neither willingness nor ability to lead. It has not only failed to step forward to organize an international campaign to prevent and control the virus from becoming a pandemic, but also tried to hinder cooperation and create conflicts. This is stunning for the world.
The international community initially expected China and the US to cooperate in fighting the pandemic. After 13 rounds of difficult negotiations, the phase one trade deal between the two countries was signed in early 2020, and the tensions that had lasted for more than a year were finally eased, putting the brakes on the decline of bilateral relations. Before the two parties formally signed the agreement, the Presidents had a phone call on December 20, 2019. President Xi Jinping highlighted that “China and the United States have reached a phase one trade deal based on equality and mutual respect. Under the current extremely complex international environment, such an agreement between China and the United States is beneficial to both countries and the peace and prosperity of the world.”
Under such circumstances, people had high expectations for China-US relations, and the hope for cooperation between the two countries had been rekindled.
In the face of this sudden pandemic, people habitually assumed that the two countries could turn this global public health crisis into an opportunity to improve relations and resume cooperation. This was based on their experiences of China and the United States working together to counter terrorism in 2001, fight SARS in 2003, deal with the global financial crisis in 2008 and fight the Ebola virus in 2014.
However, things did not go the way people expected. After the outbreak of the epidemic in Wuhan, the US government did not show concern or desire to cooperate. Instead, it evacuated its citizens, cut off flights, and Secretary of Commerce Ross called the epidemic in China an “opportunity to speed up the return of job opportunities,” remarks that showed a total lack of compassion and humanity. Some companies, individuals and overseas Chinese in the United States did send material aid to China, but according to Chinese official information, there was no substantial assistance sent by the US government. The "Wall Street Journal" op-ed article titled "China is the real ‘sick man of Asia’," provoked the painful memories of the Chinese people, setting off a war of words between the two countries. When the US side refused to apologize, the Chinese side canceled the permits of three American journalists stationed in China, the US then retaliated by reducing the number of Chinese journalists in Washington. The momentum of reduced tensions brought by the phase one trade agreement between China and the US quickly dissipated.
The outbreak and loss of control over the pandemic in the US have led to an economic downturn, and changed the dynamics of the US presidential election of 2020. The Trump administration, in an attempt to shift responsibility for its ineffective pandemic response and protect the president’s re-election prospects, adopted the tactic of “passing the buck” to China, setting off a campaign of China-bashing. White House statements were being seen as official guidance, emphasizing that due to delays, lack of transparency, intentionally spreading the virus through tourists, and colluding with the World Health Organization, the Chinese government was causing the United States and the world to suffer. Some members of the US Congress moved quickly to incite complaints against China and provoke calls for full investigations into the origins of the virus. Prosecutors in some states even tried to initiate a lawsuit against China aimed at exacting compensations.
China has no intention of yielding to this pressure and rebuffed the false claims with data and facts to demonstrate how the Communist Party of China and the government have behaved responsibly through the measures they have taken. On June 7, the State Council Information Office released the white paper "China's Actions to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic," which gave a detailed account of the Chinese people’s course and endeavors in the fight against the pandemic.
The worsening pandemic has in no way stopped the Trump administration’s attempt to exert pressure on China. Instead, it has promulgated new trade and export regulations against Huawei, restricting and even preparing to block Huawei’s access to US software and hardware products. Further, it has listed more Chinese companies and institutions on the “entity list,” and has moved to restrict Chinese companies listed on the US stock exchanges. In doing so, the US is clearly demonstrating its intention of “decoupling” from China in the areas of technology and industry.
At the same time, some people in US strategic circles have accused China of using the pandemic to drive a wedge in the trans-Atlantic relationship between the United States and Europe, and expand its strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region. They claim that China has tried to increase its control of international organizations, and that China "no longer concealed” its intention to compete for global leadership with the United States. On issues including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, the US Congress has stepped up legislative activities, including passing the “Taipei Act of 2019” that interferes with China's internal affairs, with more China-related bills in the pipelines for assessment. In violation of the one-China policy, the US administration has increased official contacts and exchanges with Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen authorities. Adding to this, airline connections and people-to-people exchanges between China and the US have shrunk significantly due to the pandemic, resulting in the acceleration of “decoupling” in people-to-people exchanges and cultural ties.
The rapid deterioration in relations between the two countries has also had a harmful effect on public opinions, rising resentment and hostility on both sides. A survey of 1,000 Americans conducted by the Pew Research Center from 3 to 29 March 2020 showed that 66% responded with negativity toward China, the highest level since the survey began in 2005, going up significantly from 47% in the 2017 survey. This year’s survey also indicated that around 62% of the respondents believed that China's power and influence were a major threat to the United States. According to a national survey conducted by the Harris Poll Center in April, 90% of Republicans and 67% of Democrats believed that China should be held responsible for the spread of the pandemic, and 66% of Republicans and 38% of Democrats believed the Trump government should adopt a tougher policy towards China. Although there are no polling agencies in China that conducts similar surveys, judging from comments on the internet and the tone of the media, the Chinese public is resentful of such anti-China rhetoric and actions by the US. This negative sentiment and distrust of the US in China has reached its highest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations.
On May 20, the White House website released the report on "U.S. Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China" (hereinafter referred to as "Strategic Approach"). The report was submitted to the US Congress in accordance with the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 and was not a new strategy for China. It did however contain updated policy thinking based on changes in the situation and rejected the policy of engagement with China taken by previous US administrations. It keenly exaggerated the "threat" and "challenges" that China's rise had bought to the United States, clearly described the path of competition and clamored for ideological confrontation. It can be seen that the new strategy of US competition against China is one step closer to completion.
Why so? US hard liners regard strategic competition with China as the top priority, and do not want the cooperation needed between the two sides in fighting the pandemic to ease this competition and distract or even disrupt their "strategic deployment" or “strategic plan.” Rather, they are trying to take the opportunity to scale up the competition. The concept of "principled realism" was highlighted in the "Strategic Approach," and has become a key phrase for explaining the US strategy toward China.
Looking back on the realist tradition in US foreign strategy, it can be seen that the most influential thinking came from striving for "peace with strength" seen during the Reagan period, known as "Reaganism." At that time, during the Cold War, the United States was not in a very favorable position. The Reagan government vigorously played up the US expansion of armament and nuclear deterrence, trapping the Soviet Union into an arms race. In recent years, assuming challenges such as the revival of Russia and the rise of China, some American scholars have initiated the term "offensive realism." Their basic assumption is that due to the anarchic nature of the international system, major powers are doomed to the tragedy of competition. They therefore advocate offensive thinking and action to guard against opponents, safeguard their power positions, and defend the US hegemony.
"Principled realism" is more like a hybrid of Reaganism's "peace through strength" and the concept of "offensive realism." It seems likely that the White House will attempt to develop a new theory based on this to shape future US government policies towards China.
In a downward spiral, China-US relations are witnessing the most difficult time since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. If the US strategic adjustment to China is compared to the 360-degrees of a “circle,” then the first 180-degrees was more or less drawn by the end of 2018, meaning that the US at all levels – government, academia, and social sectors, had arrived at a consensus on the need to adjust their strategies toward China. However, there was a lack of consensus on how to draw the remaining 180-degrees – that is, there was no consensus yet on what kind of new and effective China strategies should be implemented. Some have advocated "smart competition" by maintaining necessary contact and cooperation while strengthening containment, while others are clamoring to fight China at all costs. The direction of US political mobilization since 2019 has been to promote the formation of a clearer “whole of society consensus” to compete against China. The collision between the two countries during the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly accelerated this process, and the situation may continue to deteriorate before it gets better.
US steps up its competition with China
The conflict between China and the United States has now become the main factor shaping the international landscape. The tension between the two countries is mainly instigated by the United States, which is trying to provoke competition across four fronts:
First, the fight over political systems and values. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, Western thinkers had already begun to worry that the success of China - a non-Western country, would dilute the appeal of Western values. This in turn would further confirm the failure of “America and the West” in trying to lead the world after the Cold War based on their political system and values. From the perspective of US strategic circles, China's rise is not only a challenge to the United States' practical interests and international status but also to the credibility of its system and the right to export its values. This is a challenge of even deeper ramification. From the Chinese perspective, the United States has never given up its attempts to subvert the socialist system led by the Chinese Communist Party. In recent remarks about China, US government officials went so far as to separate the Chinese Communist Party from the Chinese people. This was an attempt to create conflict and challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the political system. So China must resolutely fight against such attempts.
The “Strategic Approach” targets China’s governance and the ruling party. It lists “value challenge” as one of China’s three major challenges to the United States. It highlights the ideological roots of China’s domestic and foreign policies. It seems to deliberately misrepresent China as the former Soviet Union. The intention is to prioritize political and security elements in US-China competition, thereby providing a basis to coerce companies and the economic community into accepting "decoupling." Such a path will inevitably lead the two countries into being caught in an ideological war with zero-sum confrontation.
Second, the fight on narrative. Since the beginning of this year, the focus of the US has shifted from a trade war with China to a war on narrative, but this doesn’t mean abandoning competition in other areas.
The deterioration in trade relations was controlled after the signing of the phase one trade deal. In the security realm, the conventional idea of the US military is to maintain adequate deterrence rather than proactively attack. However, in terms of narrative, the US has vast experience in shaping its narrative and traditional influence in the international public opinion, while China is excluded from the established information and influence media used to court public opinion in the United States and the rest of the Western world. This results in first-hand-information about China not being sufficiently accessible in the United States and the international community.
To fight a war on narrative, one needs to set up a clear and straightforward theme that can directly touch the hearts of people. When applied repeatedly through many facets and in multiple contexts, the theme would engulf the public opinion. From the recent performance and statements of hardliners in the US, we can clearly see the course of the campaign against China, and the theme is "China can’t be trusted." The purpose is to subvert the image of China as a successful and responsible country following its reform and opening-up. In other words, its objective is to change China’s “national character” and label it as “dishonest” and “untrustworthy,” thereby undermining China in international discourse. During the Cold War, the United States did the same thing, and placed various labels on the Soviet Union, undermining its image in the eyes of the public until they considered it unacceptable from a moral perspective.
Third, the fight for economic and financial security. The pandemic has had a major impact on the US economy. According to statistics from the US Department of Labor, the US unemployment rate reached 14.7% in April 2020, declining slightly in May, but was still at a high of 13.3%. The economic downturn has led to a rapid deterioration in the US fiscal situation in the first eight months of the fiscal year 2020. US fiscal expenditure was expected to exceed US$ 3.925 trillion, an increase of US$912 billion over the same period last year, a growth rate of more than 30%. During April and May when the pandemic got serious, the federal government's revenues fell by 45.8%, while its expenditure increased by 93.6%, and the deficit was as high as US$1.162 trillion. It is estimated that the fiscal deficits of the US federal government will be as high as US$3.7 trillion and US$2.1 trillion in fiscal years 2020 and 2021 respectively. Such fiscal deterioration has led to a rapid increase in the US federal debt, and as of June 10, its total amount has been close to US$26 trillion, which means that in the first eight months of this fiscal year, the federal debt has increased by more than US$3 trillion. The Federal Reserve also predicts that the US economy will shrink by 6.5% in 2020 , and therefore it is expected that by the end of this fiscal year, the US fiscal deficit this year and the federal debt will account for 18% and 140% of gross domestic product (GDP) respectively, a heavy burden for the US government.
In response to the economic decline caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the US government has launched a rescue plan of about US$3 trillion. The Federal Reserve also plans to keep the federal interest rate unchanged in the range of 0% to 0.25% until full employment and price stability are achieved. These unscrupulous stimulus and helicopter money spreading measures will not only raise the debt ratio and deficit rate but will also stimulate high financial leverage speculation and the overflow of liquidity, producing potential market risks. With the continuous expansion of debt, the US federal deficit as a proportion of GDP may remain above 10% in the next few years or even longer.
Under these circumstances, a more anxious US is using the concerns among some countries about the security of the supply chain during the pandemic to exaggerate the risk of “China’s weaponization” of its competitive industries, and accelerate "de-sinicization" in the structural adjustments of industrial chains and supply chains. The ideal goal in the US strategic calculations is to achieve "de-sinicization" through "de-globalization", utilizing modified rules, resetting standards, reorganizing regional trading blocks, reforming international mechanisms, and "decoupling" key technologies and industries. A handful of US politicians have advocated using financial hegemony to suppress China. This option cannot be completely ruled out, although the abuse of financial tools will also harm the credibility of the US and the US dollar.
Nevertheless, the formation and adjustment of global supply chains are the results of the evolving international division of labor. Many foreign-funded enterprises in China regard the local market as their main business target, and it is unlikely that they will leave China on a large scale in the short term unless there are greater political and security pressure.
The fourth area of contention is in strategic and maritime security. In the field of military security, the US has growing concerns about China at the strategic, tactical and operational levels, and is trying to increase pressure and balancing. On issues involving China's sovereignty and security, China is compelled to respond to this pressure and provocation and take appropriate countermeasures and necessary actions. Looking to the future, the uncertainties in China-US military relations will continue to rise, and it will be difficult to make up for their lack of strategic trust. It is no accident that the military ships and aircraft of the two countries often meet at close distance at sea and in the air. The chance of friction is increasing.
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the US military deployed overseas had to reduce their global operations for fear of the virus. However, to prevent China from "taking the opportunity to fill the strategic vacuum," it has increased the frequency of patrols and reconnaissance and intensified provocations against China in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and the East China Sea. The greatest uncertainty in the interaction between the two militaries lies in the fact that both sides have not established effective crisis management and control mechanisms. The rules of engagement are not clearly understood, and the "red lines" are not clear either. This has resulted in both sides constantly testing each other, increasing the risk of accidents and uncontrollable consequences. The two countries and two militaries have reached strategic agreement on “non-conflict and non-confrontation.” How to follow it through on the ground is an issue that both sides need to consider seriously.
The strategic deterrence dynamic between China and the United States has also seen some changes. The US is moving to adjust its nuclear strategy, update its nuclear arsenal, lower its nuclear threshold, develop missile defense systems and hypersonic aircraft, and prepare to deploy medium-range missiles around China. All these developments may widen the gap in nuclear power between the two countries. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether these changes will force China to consider necessary adjustments. Besides, both China and the United States are major players in researching and developing new weapons platforms and military technologies driven by artificial intelligence technology. Both countries are keen to explore the militarization of cyberspace, space, and the Polar Regions. How to control competition in these areas is something that needs to be discussed seriously.
The global background of China-US contention
Many scholars regard the COVID-19 pandemic as a watershed in the history of the post-war world and believe that its impact on mankind is not only psychological but also materialistic. At present, the changes it has brought about, instead of being subversive, have acted as catalysts and accelerators, comprehensively speeding up and deepening existing changes. For example, economic globalization and regionalization are rapidly adjusting as international power is further fragmented; strategic competition among major powers is resurfacing; and domestic governance in some countries is being severely challenged. The deterioration of China-US relations has not occurred in isolation and it needs to be examined and evaluated at all levels from many perspectives.
From the perspective of economic globalization, the pandemic has further challenged global thinking. We are seeing major economies reflecting on the risks of external dependence of the industrial chain under the current model of globalization. Some analysts believe that under the framework of economic globalization, three sub-systems may emerge that are respectively centered on China (East Asia), the United States, and the European Union. These would radiate outward, with offshore outsourcing being increasingly replaced by near-shore outsourcing. The production base will be moved closer to the terminal consumer markets, and the supply chain may become shorter and more diversified, to enable a flexible response to sudden fluctuations.
The formation of the "three centers" will also prompt a corresponding adjustment to the flow of international capital, and aggravate the "decoupling" of China and the United States. Judging from the current policy discussions and proposed measures in various countries, we may foresee the following developments: First, the manufacturing of products critical to the safety of the US, such as bio-medicine, personal protective equipment (PPE), and some cutting-edge manufacturing companies may move out of China. Additionally, new US legislation if enacted will force the companies to relocate. Second, labor-intensive industries may transfer from China at a faster pace due to higher cost of production. This may reduce the United States’ dependence on China for durable consumer goods. Third, industrial giants that are adapted to the needs of the Chinese market will remain and continue to benefit from the recovery of the Chinese market, as their global sales decline. Fourth, the “decoupling” of high-tech industries such as 5G will result in China being excluded from the markets of the US and some of its allies, potentially resulting in different systems and standards being created.
From the perspective of global governance, China and the US still have broad common interests in addressing global challenges, and functional cooperation between professionals of the two countries has been maintained. These include important areas such as infectious disease prevention and response to climate change. However, the current US government not only lacks policy support and resource input for cooperation between the two countries in the global arena, but also tries to prevent China from exerting influence in international affairs, considering the exclusion of China from multilateral institutions as an important diplomatic goal. The Trump administration has made the World Trade Organization almost dysfunctional, terminated cooperation with the World Health Organization, and prevented Chinese candidates from assuming key leadership positions in the World Intellectual Property Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. At the same time, it has negotiated and signed new bilateral free trade agreements based on "zero tariffs, zero barriers, and zero subsidies" with many countries, and implanted "poison pill clauses" that exclude China. This series of actions by the US has greatly disrupted and interfered with the system of international governance and cooperation underpinning the United Nations. Continued pursuit of such US-centric ambitions will inevitably affect the will and ability of the international community to meet common challenges.
From the perspective of the international structure, China's description of the international power structure following the end of the Cold War, namely "one superpower and multiple major powers", has been shaken by the relative power changes between the United States and China. At the annual symposium on the international situation hosted by the Center for International Security and Strategy of Tsinghua University at the beginning of 2020, scholars from strategic circles at home and abroad evaluated the distribution of power in the world today. An important view is that the United States’ world hegemony is unsustainable, but as a superpower, it still commands superior influence. Although there is a considerable gap between China and the United States in terms of hard and soft power, when it comes to economic scale, the gap is much smaller, as China has pulled ahead of many other countries. Together, China and the United States account for approximately 40% of the world’s total economic output, and 44% of global military expenditures. How these two relatively powerful countries will define their relationship and whether or not they can anchor their expectations about global stability is the biggest issue in current international politics.
Chinese scholars believe that there is still a large gap between China and the United States in terms of strength, and China is unwilling to accept the concept of "two superpowers," and the international community also has bad memories of the "bipolar world." The two leading countries will inevitably have the greatest influence on world development, and therefore must assume greater responsibilities, including better insight into each other’s intentions, and avoiding strategies based on misjudgments. More importantly, the two must explore new global issues and advance international consensus, which would normally be a slow process involving complex interactions. However, as the consequences of COVID-19 have been interwoven with changes due to the US election, and alongside intensifying political, economic and social conflicts in the US, its self-confidence has been declining, and its fears and doubts about China have deepened. This will inevitably affect the way and pace of interaction between the two countries as they explore new paths. But no matter in which direction they go, they will move much faster. This speed only increases the urgency for China and the United States to define their perceptions of each other and agree on how they can work together.
When China and the US are locked in a strategic contest, the third-party perspectives cannot be ignored. China-US relations have become the main element that influences the formation of the new world structure. Will the world remain on the track of peace and development, or will it enter an age of strategic competition or even conflict between the major powers? To a large extent, this depends on how China and the United States define their relationship (as "enemy" or "non-enemy"), and the outcome will be quite different. In the process of determining the future direction, both countries will be influenced by the policy directions of the other. Other major parties in the world, whether they are allies of the United States such as some European countries, Japan, and Australia, or developing countries such as India, have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. These countries constitute a kind of "third-party force."
China has huge influence on the world economy, as 70% of countries and regions in the world take China as their largest trading partner. The United States has a leading edge in world finance and technology. It maintains traditional influences in international affairs and over allies. It therefore still plays a leading role in the world. In this context, "third-party forces" generally do not want to see China-US relationship so tense that it leads to major world divisions. And other countries do not want to choose sides between China and the US because they are inextricably linked by mutual interests to either country. However, if China and the US move toward irreversible conflict, many countries that do not enjoy the benefits and security guarantees from China will find it difficult to support China even if they do not choose to stand with the US.
During the pandemic, I attended domestic and international online academic conferences. I noticed that the international academic community has been talking about the “rise of the other,” which implies that if the world becomes leadless, it will be necessary to consider how to build a new collective leadership. In 2019, France and Germany put forward the initiative of “Multilateralism Alliance," which is intended to unite multiple countries when responding to the challenges of unilateralism and safeguard their interests as well as the global governance system.
The above is the global background for the China-US competition, and these highly complex, diverse, and multi-level factors are fluid and can be reversed. The competition between China and the United States is inevitable, but it is unlike the confrontation during the US-Soviet Cold War and previous struggles between major powers. So simple parallels should be avoided.
The more typical competitions between major powers that have appeared in modern history, such as between Britain and Germany before the First World War, the United States and Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, or the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in the second half of the 20th century, all had some similar features. They all had the background of a global economic crisis, and the rising powers displaying an aggressive attitude. While the existing powers, driven by their strong sense of anxiety and fear of being replaced, chose policies intended to contain the rising powers.
However, the competition between China and the US has been made artificially prominent following a relatively long period of peaceful global development and economic globalization based on a strong interdependence between the two countries and between them and many other countries. Furthermore, China has achieved comprehensive development and has grown with strength peacefully. These characteristics and conditions did not exist in the previous instances of vicious competition among big powers. This has determined that China-US competition would be more complicated, and the gains and losses would be less clear-cut. Although the competition has been wide-ranging and sometimes fierce, considerable space still exists between a relationship that is competitive and one that is hostile. The most important challenge or choice that China and the US need to face is whether they will continue to resolve their differences within the existing global system, or split up into two relatively independent however interconnected systems, each going its own way. If the latter comes true, it would mean the end of globalization and the disintegration of the existing system.
Is a new type of major country relationship featuring benign competition achievable between China and the US?
Entering the third decade of the 21st century, the curtain has been lifted on a protracted contest between China and the US. Whether voluntarily or not, the Chinese have been dragged into it. It is worth noting that the US no longer enjoys the position of absolute superiority it held immediately after the end of the Cold War. Nor has it sufficient reasons and the popularity needed to launch a global mobilization of all-round strategic containment and the ideological siege of China. China-US relations have opened a new chapter, and the two sides need to re-evaluate each other in this new environment. The two differ in philosophies and interests but share broad common interests on such matters as global stability and sustainable development. They also share the common responsibility for preserving the existing system and the general trend of world peace and cooperation.
Currently, China and the US have very different perceptions about the nature of their bilateral competition. It is no exaggeration to say that their goals are of different dimensions: the US firmly believes China’s purpose is to take over its role as the global leader, and the competition is about who will be world No.1 and who will be No.2. So, its strategy is aimed at effectively restraining China in every respect; while China intends to realize its “two centenary” development goals (By 2021, which is the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party, China will then achieve the objective of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects. By the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in the middle of this century, China will realize modernization and become a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful) and national rejuvenation. So, if there is anything it is fighting for, it is room for continued development. Whether China and the US will slide into zero-sum confrontation, or achieve a relationship of “coopetition” (cooperation plus competition), rests on whether the two sides can objectively judge each other’s strength and intentions, and whether they can find middle ground where their respective goals won’t be mutually exclusive.
For the rest of 2020, US diplomatic actions will inevitably be affected by their upcoming election. The economic recession, the polarization of the two parties, protests against racial inequality and other social issues, and the controversy over President Trump himself, are causing continuous turmoil in the United States. The degree of partisan politics and polarization of popular sentiments is greater than ever before. The hype regarding the "China threat" has further spilled over into a "high politics" debate. As hardliners work hard to intensify the conflict with China, the potential use of various excuses to launch fierce offensives and take radical measures could make the situation of China-US relations even more severe.
No matter what the outcome of the upcoming US general elections will be, the future orientation of China-US relations calls for careful, rational deliberation by decision-makers on both sides. One can see trends in two directions in the US as to how it should apply a new strategy toward China: one is led by the right-wingers in Washington who advocate confrontation with an “all-round suppression” of China. They constantly instigate disputes, making every effort to reduce bilateral communications in various fields, and persistently pushing for “de-coupling,” using such topics as “national security concerns” and “political differences”; the other is a relatively rational force, which is against abandoning “limited engagement,” and hopes to maintain pragmatic relations. It urges the Chinese to adjust and change practices of “rule violation” and “unfairness.” The harm the Trump administration’s radical China policies have done to the US itself is increasingly conspicuous. Therefore, although the latter’s ideas are often obscured by the louder voices of confrontational rhetoric, it does not mean they do not have broad and quiet support. As domestic political conditions evolve in the US, their influence may rise.
How should China cope with competition with the US and the latter’s provocation, how can it accurately judge global trends to ensure the process of achieving the two centenary goals at home is not disrupted, and how can it guarantee an external environment of peace and cooperation the country’s development needs? How can it achieve a greater understanding of its policies overseas, and effectively secure international cooperation on the road to building a community with a shared future for mankind, while safeguarding world peace and development from disruption? These are key questions facing China in the 21st century. China’s choice regarding the direction of the two countries’ relations will to a great extent determine how it answers these questions.
It goes without saying that the challenges posed by the adjustment of the US policy and strategy toward China are severe. Of the two choices discussed, the first means head-on confrontation, with the intention of dragging the relationship onto a path of vicious competition. If that happens, it will be hard for China not to suffer a major setback on its development path. Once China and the US slide towards partial or even complete "decoupling," the US will have fewer apprehensions about taking extreme actions against China, and it will become more difficult for China to further deepen its reform and opening-up. The second direction appears to be mild, but if we go along with it, the US could potentially raise new demands. With the pressure of the so-called "compliance" spilling over from the economic and trade areas into the political and security fields, China could be bent into part of a new global system under US rule.
What needs to be realized is that the success of historical figures depends on whether their thoughts and actions conform to the trend of history. Looking at the current adjustments to the US’s China policy, we cannot underestimate the harm that may be done to the bilateral relationship. Even the possibility of its temporary deviation from the right track due to the deliberate misinterpretation and misjudgment of China by politicians out of various calculations could prove damaging. But we do not need to overestimate their ability to change historical trends, either. As President Xi Jinping said, countries have gradually formed a community of shared interests, a community of shared responsibilities and a community with a shared future. This is not only due to the natural progress of economic development but also in line with the logic seen in the history of human society. President Xi also pointed out that we should grasp the trend of the times, objectively understand the development and changes of the world, and respond to the new situation and new challenges in a responsible and rules-abiding manner.
Given this, we need to seriously consider and design the future of China-US relations, by putting forward our own choices and solutions that both effectively safeguard China’s fundamental interests and address the legitimate concerns of the US. Our ideas should also be in line with the direction of the world’s peaceful development. After all, China's development has been closely related to the world, and China and the US as two major countries will both benefit from cooperation and will both lose from confrontation. For this reason, the consensus on working jointly to foster a China-US relationship based on coordination, cooperation and stability, as reached by the leaders of the two countries, should be the fundamental guide for us when considering and designing the path forward for our relationship.
A desirable prospect for future China-US relations is, after a period of wrestling with issues and the sensible weighing of genuine interests, rational deliberations would prevail and the two sides formulate a new stable relationship of “coopetition”. While engaging in limited, controllable competition, they can maintain wide cooperation, preserve relatively stable development of bilateral ties on specific issues and collaborate in various areas and global affairs. The prospect and ultimate materialization of such a new type of major country relationship, featuring benign competition calls for serious endeavors by both parties. The challenge for China now is that the current US administration has little interest in moving in this direction and, rather, is investing more in the opposing direction. It is very difficult for China to shape the relationship in the direction explained above. And it is hard to see how there can be any positive changes on the part of the US during the coming months due to the general election. So, China’s choices and actions for the next step may play a greater role in shaping bilateral relations in the right direction.
China should stand firm and be courageous in the contest imposed by the US
We need to learn to take the position of a relatively equal peer when observing and dealing with issues in our relations with the US and adopt an objective and calm approach when evaluating the current world environment. We should make good use of the unprecedented strength and power we now possess in shaping the future. We must build up the confidence, determination and strategy to deal with this seasoned superpower.
The adjustment of China-US relations will inevitably go through a long period of difficult interactions, and China will not succeed by pleading with the US. Its purpose can be achieved only through hard struggle, fearless competition and active coordination.
In current China-US relations, China needs to do more to play a more positive leading role and inject as many rational and pragmatic elements as possible.
China may consider proactively offering suggestions and taking the initiative to promote open and honest dialogue in key areas that would allow the two sides to truly listen to each other and effectively addressing each other’s reasonable concerns, and accumulating experiences and conditions for improving the relationship. Following these principles, the first phase of the China-US trade agreement was concluded successfully. The outcome benefited both sides and contributed to the long-term relationship between them, although neither side realized all of its wishes through the deal. The implementation of this agreement will inevitably encounter difficulties, and the resistance and pressure will be mounting especially in the current environment as the atmosphere deteriorates and the pandemic escalates. However, the risk of abandoning the agreement will be greater, and the effective implementation of the agreement can prevent a faster decline in the relationship. China needs to implement the deal in real earnest for its own sake, as many of the issues involved are also what need to be resolved in China's reforms.
China will resolutely safeguard the security of its political system and development path and must oppose any attempt to interfere in its internal affairs. However, it does not aim to eliminate other systems, nor will it replicate the "American and Western" stereotypes of promoting its values around the world. To achieve stability in their relations in the new era, both countries need to deepen their understanding of each other’s core interests and the dignity of their respective political system through constructive dialogues and negotiation, sort out the lists of their respective and common concerns in order of priority, and form consensus or tacit understanding about the boundaries and bottom lines of behavior. It is necessary to cultivate the ability and habit of respecting each other’s concerns and conducting appropriate give-and-take, and agree on arrangements to manage and control any irreconcilable security interests and differences.
As the Chinese navy is growing, its intentions and goals will inevitably become issues that will concern the US and other traditional maritime powers. China wants to maintain the presence of forces and establish effective deterrence in the Western Pacific through necessary operations. We also need to carry out the responsibilities of safeguarding national security and maintaining regional peace through active consultation, maritime cooperation and effective risk management. To achieve this, China’s defense policies and objectives must be more transparent to ensure that all parties can understand the reasonable objectives and the bottom lines of its military security.
The international strategic community wants to know if China and the US can negotiate a strategic balance of power for the peaceful coexistence of their military forces. Although this does not currently exist, the establishment of communications channels in the field of strategic security is particularly important, due to the fact that both countries have major military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Channels for effective and multi-layered communication should be opened up, while at the same time the development of crisis management and control mechanisms should be strengthened to avoid misjudgments. Furthermore, although China does not participate in nuclear disarmament treaty negotiations involving bilateral issues between the United States and Russia, it has always been an important member of the international arms control system and has participated in almost all the important mechanisms. China should make proactive moves in this area, such as pushing nuclear countries to accept the "no first use" principle it advocates.
What the Chinese people care about and are good at is mainly about taking good care of their own matters. Standing at the frontier of science and technology, China needs to transform the immense pressure exerted by the United States into an impetus to strengthen itself. By making full use of the open-source knowledge environment of global science and technology, it can innovate, and address its "shortcomings" to boost self-sufficiency in technology and component. But more importantly, it must increase its "advantages" by improving its ability to promote scientific and technological progress. Only by improving China's influence in the world's technological and economic systems and maintaining healthy growth can it effectively counter the attempts to "decouple" which will only divide the world. It should also adopt a firm and timely "anti-decoupling" strategy and implement policies to resolutely maintain and enhance all exchanges. All departments of the Chinese government should do more to ensure only positive "link-ups" between the two countries to prevent further "decoupling."
We need to be guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, which clarifies China’s position as a defender and reformer of the international order and system. And by always holding high the banner of global governance and multilateralism, we can use China’s “advance” to respond to the US’s “retreat.” By acting to maintain peace and promote growth, we will hedge against the destructive actions of the United States and maintain the momentum of economic globalization. As the world faces increasing problems post-pandemic, we should assist countries to solve problems, through more positive actions and increased "empowerment" of others in international relations, by assuming the responsibility of a cooperative power. In working with other countries, we need to develop mutually beneficial cooperation, to promote world peace and development, without forming a zero-sum situation in which China and the US compete for third parties.
On global issues, when the Trump administration reduces its investment in certain areas, many countries expect China to provide leadership. We need to mobilize the enthusiasm and initiative of our various sectors to play a role in solving global problems. At present, in areas including climate change, the mechanisms of effective cooperation between the government and think tanks have been established. Both at official and social levels, we have maintained good interactions with the international community, demonstrating the strength of cooperation. This can be used as a blueprint on other major issues of global concern, including counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, drug control, transnational infectious disease prevention, artificial intelligence governance, and combating transnational crimes. To achieve this, we need to cultivate effective cooperation between government agencies and think tanks, encourage the creation of international dialogue, and improve our ability to share useful resources for solving practical problems.
In the field of international communications, we need to improve on effective communications by encouraging the wider use of the media and channels, actively training talent, and positively promoting China's image internationally. We need to provide more information and materials directly to international information databases so that people can find factual information from the Chinese people rather than from indirect sources. In the current US election, both the Republican and Democratic parties are campaigning on China topics, using misinformation about the “China threat” and “China challenge” to attract votes. While this is a challenge for China, it is not all bad, as this heightened external attention also provides China the opportunity to respond and dispel the many inaccuracies. If accomplished effectively, these honest explanations will allow more Americans, as well as the international public, to find out the real situation in China and the thinking of the Chinese people.
In short, China has grown from a relatively weak country into a stronger country with a growing degree of international influence. It has now entered a period when it needs to shift its internal affairs and diplomacy onto a more open and wider platform to showcase its new and existing strengths and wider interests. The handling of its relationship with the US also needs to reflect and adapt to this change.
Professor Graham Allison of Harvard University has done an important study to ascertain if there is a "Thucydides trap" between China and the United States. Recently, he has shifted the focus of his research onto solutions for avoiding conflicts between them, and has initiated a project called "Do You Have a Grand Strategy to Meet the China Challenge?" This research is not alone in the US. Do China’s strategic circles also need to take action to study "Grand Strategies to Deal with American Challenges"? I think so.
(The author is an ajunct professor and Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University, and is also former Vice Foreign Minister)
China News Weekly, Issue 22, 2020