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Robin Niblett:
2021-03-30

Robin Niblett,Director of Chatham House

My top-line view is that it’s unlikely that the US and China can arrive soon at a common vision of future global order. I suppose the best we can hope for is an uneasy co-existence for the next 10 years or so. But you know co-existence may not be too bad. 

Let me start off by sharing my thoughts respectfully from the side of the liberal democracies, which self-identify as a community. One which I think, certainly in the last 70 plus years, has wanted to ensure that whatever international order exists, makes the world safe for democracies. And that includes the capacity to expand the number of countries actually living under a system of governance in which you know civil societies are equally legitimate counterparts to government, in which the freedom of the individual is prioritized in many cases over the priority of the collective. These core objectives are the ones that I don’t think will be set aside. There is a belief that an effective international order has to be one that protects those elements. And the fear is that those countries that are not run by these principles will seek to change international order to one that at the very least accommodates or supports their non-democratic systems of government. There’s a natural tension between these two objectives. 

In the recent past, this was not a really big concern for most powers that consider themselves liberal democracies. For the simple reason that there was no big contester to the United States as the strongest country in the world. You saw this from the GDP figures (mentioned by) Madam Fu at the beginning. After the end of the Cold War, history seemed you could say to be on the democratic side. But now we note China’s growth, in particular, and not just in an economic scene, but also increasingly in technological, military and in geopolitical power – through the Belt and Road Initiatives, through its stronger voice in the UN, and through its greater assertiveness within its own neighborhood. All of these elements are obviously making those on the liberal democratic side fear that their system of government and international order is under threat. 

You said earlier that you wondered whether what was driving this concerned some internal stresses on the international order. I do think that the internal stresses on liberal democracies are making what is called broadly ‘the West’ feel particularly insecure. The excesses of globalization, the inequalities that emerged within our societies, the lack of preparedness and resilience which we have seen exposed through the COVID pandemic. These in a way make us doubt, in some cases, the strength of our own system of government.

But I would say nonetheless there is a clear determination to try to fight for, let’s call it, our corner. And you will see this and are seeing it through the way that NATO is redefining itself; in the way the European Union, a strong economic partner of China, is nonetheless trying to reduce its dependence on China by investment screening, new laws on technology, and against misinformation. 

And more broadly, there is the desire, I’m sure we’ll talk about more, amongst the United States and some other allies to build up an Indo-Pacific coalition. And, another initiative this year, the British government has been pushing the idea of enlarging the G7 into a larger group of like-minded states. My sense is that you perhaps now fear that the liberal international order seeks to undermine, change your system of governance. Somehow, we want to impose our system of governance on to your country and that of others. And obviously, you’ve watched the “Pivot to Asia”, as it was described in the Obama administration, the Indo-Pacific alliance, and you have noted your concerns about Western resistance to the BRI. There is a conflict emerging here between these two different perspectives. I would simply say that the ‘security dilemma’, to use that shorthand, appears to be growing. 

So the question to finish up here, can the two sides coexist? I would say two things about this. Number one, this is clearly not yet a Cold War. China’s economic size is important, and the global economy is growing. The members of the liberal international order are as integrated into the Chinese economy as China is into ours, and this is not just the US, but also Germany, Australia, Japan; all countries are integrated together. 

And ultimately, and this is the most important element from my perspective, no group of countries or individual country alone will be able to face the big challenges to this planet that we share together, climate change, global pandemics, cybersecurity, etc. This has been reflected in some recent agreements we have seen, where the EU has sought to establish its investment relationship on a predictable basis with China, and other Western countries have signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. I noticed Kurt Campbell, now reinstalled in the new administration with a strong voice on Asia-Pacific policy, has written in a number of outlets recently that he thought the competition is more economic and technological and may not be military. 

I think the key question is, and this is the second part of enabling coexistence: can we build trust? Trust is deeply lacking. One place I think we need to focus this year is on the environment. COP 26 in Glasgow at the end of this year is an opportunity to test whether, from our different systems, China, Europe, United States and other countries around the world can come together and show that we do have a common agenda for the planet together. If we can simply do that above all, I think we will start to put in place some of the trust to avoid the worst outcomes. 

If we look forward to 2035, we can potentially see a West that has had has time to fix itself and a China with growing internal self-confidence being accommodated. And perhaps we will both be a little less insecure. We believe we see China’s insecurities through its actions in Hong Kong, and internally in Xinjiang. We also face our insecurities in the West. I hope despite all this that we will find the time and make the good decisions to be able to grow into a shared place in the world order.


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