三、科技问题
2019/09 《没有灾难的竞争：美国如何与中国在竞争中共存》
Competition Without Catastrophe: How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China
美国必须保护其技术优势。要做到这一点，就必须加强对技术投资和贸易双向流动的限制，但这些努力应该有选择地进行，而不是一刀切，对国家安全和人权至关重要的技术进行限制，而对那些不重要的技术则允许正常的贸易和投资继续进行。即使是这些有针对性的限制，也必须在与产业界和其他政府协商的情况下进行；如果不这样做，就会阻碍知识和人才的流动，从而使全球技术生态系统巴尔干化。这样的发展将抵消美国相对于中国的一个关键竞争优势：一个开放的经济可以源源不断地引进全球最优秀的人才并综合世界各地的优势达到最大突破。同时，在技术限制上的过度扩张可能会促使其他国家向中国靠拢，尤其中国目前已经是大多数国家的最大贸易伙伴。
The United States will also have to safeguard its technological advantages in the face of China’s intellectual property theft, targeted industrial policies, and commingling of its economic and security sectors. Doing so will require some enhanced restrictions on the flow of technology investment and trade in both directions, but these efforts should be pursued selectively rather than wholesale, imposing curbs on technologies that are critical to national security and human rights and allowing regular trade and investment to continue for those that are not. Even these targeted restrictions must be undertaken in consultation with industry and other governments; failing to do so could Balkanize the global technology ecosystem by impeding flows of knowledge and talent. Such a development would neutralize a key U.S. competitive advantage relative to China: an open economy that can source the best global talent and synthesize the biggest breakthroughs from around the world. Meanwhile, overreach on technology restrictions could drive other countries toward China, especially since China is already the largest trading partner for most.
在这方面，特朗普政府单方面地反对中国公司华为参与5G基础设施建设可能会提供一个警示性的教训。如果政府事先与盟友和合作伙伴进行协调，并尝试进行一些创造性的政策制定--例如，建立一个多边贷款倡议，以补贴购买华为设备的替代品--它可能会在说服各国考虑其他供应商方面取得更大的成功。在华为被美国商务部列入实体名单后，华为在推出5G技术方面延迟了两年，如果早先采取创造性的政策，美国的公司有可能会利用这段时间开展研发。未来限制与中国在技术领域贸易的努力如果要想取得成功，就需要仔细考虑、提前规划和多边支持；否则，它们将有可能破坏美国的创新。
In this respect, the Trump administration’s loud and largely unilateral campaign against the participation of the Chinese company Huawei in the development of 5G infrastructure may provide a cautionary lesson. Had the administration coordinated with allies and partners in advance and tried some creative policymaking—for example, establishing a multilateral lending initiative to subsidize the purchase of alternatives to Huawei’s equipment—it might have had more success in convincing states to consider other vendors. It then might have been able to make the most of the two-year delay Huawei now faces in rolling out 5G following its placement on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s list of entities that cannot be supplied with American technology. Future efforts to restrict trade with China in the technology sector will require careful deliberation, advance planning, and multilateral support if they are to be successful; otherwise, they will risk undermining U.S. innovation.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/13/competition-without-catastrophe-how-america-can-both-challenge-and-coexist-with-china-pub-79840
四、军事问题
2019/09 《没有灾难的竞争：美国如何与中国在竞争中共存》
Competition Without Catastrophe: How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China
与冷战时期真正意义上的全球军事竞争相比，当前的美中军事竞争很可能仅限于印太地区。但该地区至少有四个潜在热点：南海、东海、台湾海峡和朝鲜半岛。双方都不希望发生冲突，但随着双方都在加大对进攻能力的投入，加强在该地区的军事存在，并在越来越近的距离内开展军事行动，紧张局势正在加剧。美国担心中国正试图将美军赶出西太平洋，而中国则担心美国正试图对其形成包围。鉴于中方对美军飞机和军舰的骚扰，小摩擦可能升级为大对抗；中国人民解放军前海军司令吴胜利上将曾警告道：任何此类事件 “都可能引发战争”。
In contrast to the military competition of the Cold War, which was a truly global struggle, the dangers for Washington and Beijing are likely to be confined to the Indo-Pacific. Even so, the region features at least four potential hot spots: the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Korean Peninsula. Neither side wishes for conflict, but tensions are rising as both invest in offensive capabilities, boost their military presence in the region, and operate in ever-closer proximity. Washington fears that China is trying to push U.S. forces out of the western Pacific, and Beijing fears that the United States is trying to hem it in. Given China’s harassment of U.S. aircraft and naval vessels, minor incidents risk escalating into major military confrontations; Admiral Wu Shengli, the former naval commander of the People’s Liberation Army, has warned that any such incident “could spark war.”
我们不应否认两国军队在印太地区共存的可能性。美国必须承认，鉴于中国武器的覆盖范围较广，寻求恢复美国在全球军事中的首要地位将是困难的。相反，美国必须将重点放在阻止中国干涉其行动自由，以及可能对美国盟友和区域伙伴进行的武力胁迫上。中国将不得不接受美国仍将是该地区（印太地区）的常驻力量的事实，美国在印太地区仍占有主要的军事存在、海上行动和联盟和伙伴关系网络。
But coexistence in the Indo-Pacific by both militaries should not be dismissed as impossible. The United States must accept that military primacy will be difficult to restore, given the reach of China’s weapons, and instead focus on deterring China from interfering with its freedom of maneuver and from physically coercing U.S. allies and partners. Beijing will have to accept that the United States will remain a resident power in the region, with a major military presence, naval operations in its major waterways, and a network of alliances and partnerships.
台湾和南海很可能对这一总体方针构成最重大的挑战。任何一种情况下的军事挑衅或误解都很容易引发更大的战火，甚至造成毁灭性的后果，这种风险必须引起中美高层的重视。
Taiwan and the South China Sea are likely to present the most significant challenges to this overall approach. A military provocation or misunderstanding in either case could easily trigger a larger conflagration, with devastating consequences, and this risk must increasingly animate the thinking of senior leaders in both Washington and Beijing.
为实现共存，美国需要加强对美中问题的危机管理能力，并加强自身威慑能力。即使作为冷战时期的对手，美国和苏联也曾协同努力，以降低将小摩擦升级为核战争的风险。为了达到这一目的，当时的美苏设立了军事热线，制定了行为准则，并签署了军控协议。然而在太空和网络空间等新领域增加了冲突升级的风险之际，美国和中国却缺乏管理危机的类似工具。
To achieve such coexistence, Washington will need to enhance both U.S.-Chinese crisis management and its own capacity for deterrence. Even as Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union worked concertedly to reduce the risk that an accidental collision would escalate to nuclear war; they set up military hot lines, established codes of conduct, and signed arms control agreements. The United States and China lack similar instruments to manage crises at a time when new domains of potential conflict, such as space and cyber-space, have increased the risk of escalation.
在每个军事领域，两国都至少需要制定一份类似于《美苏防止海上事故协定》(INCSEA)的正式且详细的协议，这项1972年签署的协议建立了一套旨在避免海事误解的具体规则。美国和中国还需要更多的沟通渠道和机制来避免冲突（尤其是在南海），使双方能够在事件突发时迅速澄清彼此意图，避免战略误判。双边军事关系不应再受制于政治分歧，两军高层应进行更频繁，更具实质性的讨论，以深化个人友谊及对双方行为的理解。历史上，其中一些努力的进展被证明是困难的，尤其是危机沟通。中国领导人担心，危机沟通的存在或将鼓励美军肆意妄为（行为丧失惩罚的约束），此外，其将权力下放给战区高级军官的需求对于中国领导人来说也是值得三思的。但鉴于中国不断增长的实力和进行中的军事改革，这些担忧或将消解。
In every military domain, the two countries need agreements that are at least as formal and detailed as the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, a 1972 deal that established a set of specific rules aimed at avoiding maritime misunderstandings. The United States and China also need more communication channels and mechanisms to avoid conflict—especially in the South China Sea—to allow each side to quickly clarify the other’s intentions during an incident. The bilateral military relationship should no longer be held hostage to political disagreements, and senior military officials on both sides should engage in more frequent and substantive discussions to build personal ties as well as understandings of each side’s operations. Historically, progress on some of these efforts, especially crisis communication, has proved difficult: Chinese leaders fear that crisis communication could embolden the United States to act with impunity and would require devolving too much authority to senior military officers in the field. But these worries may be easing, given China’s growing power and military reforms.
与历史上的全球冷战不同，美中之间的角力或将局限于印太地区。为保持在印太地区的威慑力并阻止中国的冒险主义，美国应将其投资重心从昂贵且脆弱的平台建设（如航母）转向相对投入较少，但却能对中国起到威慑作用的非对称作战能力的培养上，而这需要借鉴中方的做法。正如中国依靠相对廉价的反舰巡航导弹和弹道导弹一样，美国也应接受远程无人航母攻击机（ long-range unmanned carrier-based strike aircraft）、无人水下飞行器、巡航导弹潜艇和高速打击武器，它们的存在将保护美国及盟国利益，甚至可以削弱中国成功进攻的信心，减少冲突和误判的风险。美国还应将部分军事力量向东南亚和印度洋分散，必要时采用准入协议而非永久军事基地。这将使部分美军部署在中国的精准打击体系之外，使其能够迅速化解危机并处理美中冲突之外的各种突发事件，包括人道主义援助、灾难救援和反海盗任务。
Unlike the global Cold War, the tussle between Washington and Beijing will likely be confined to the Indo-Pacific.To ensure deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reorient its investments away from expensive and vulnerable platforms, such as aircraft carriers, and toward cheaper asymmetric capabilities designed to discourage Chinese adventurism without spending vast sums. This calls for taking a page from Beijing’s own playbook. Just as China has relied on relatively cheap antiship cruise and ballistic missiles, the United States should embrace long-range unmanned carrier-based strike aircraft, unmanned underwater vehicles, guided missile submarines, and high-speed strike weapons. All these weapons could protect U.S. and allied interests, even as they dent China’s confidence that its offensive operations will succeed and reduce the risk of collision and miscalculation. The United States should also diversify some of its military presence toward Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, making use of access agreements rather than permanent basing when necessary. This would place some U.S. forces beyond China’s precision-strike complex, preserving their ability to promptly address crises. It would also preposition them to address a wide range of contingencies beyond conflicts involving China, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antipiracy missions.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/13/competition-without-catastrophe-how-america-can-both-challenge-and-coexist-with-china-pub-79840
CISS实习生：张诚杨、郑玮琨、王叶湑、黄婷、李欣芷
CISS指导老师：董汀、姚锦祥、苏艳婷
