导读
5月9日，国际著名周刊《经济学人》（The Economist）“By Invitation”专栏， 邀请清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员、中国论坛特约专家周波，就俄乌时局撰写特稿，阐述中国立场。周波认为，北约越受“欢迎”，欧洲就越不安全。俄乌冲突将加速地缘政治由西向东转移。该专栏发起两年，已特邀140余位全球政要、企业领袖、学者专家等独家撰稿，包括基辛格、奥巴马、陆克文、比尔盖茨、马凯硕等。中国（内地）迄今有傅莹、李世默和周波三人获邀。中国论坛和《观察者网》联袂发布中文版如下，以飨读者。
如果敌人的敌人是我的朋友，那么朋友的敌人也是我的敌人吗？不见得。俄乌间战火纷飞的当下，中国的考虑大抵如此。一方面，中国是俄罗斯的战略伙伴，另一方面，中国是乌克兰的最大贸易伙伴。因此，北京竭尽全力，在两个朋友之间的战争中寻求平衡：中国表示理解俄罗斯对北约扩张的“合理关切”，同时强调，“所有国家的主权和领土完整都必须得到尊重”。
对交战双方来讲，这种精心考量的中立也许并不是他们真正想要的，但却是可以接受的。如果中国与西方一起谴责俄罗斯，华盛顿和大多数欧洲国家都会鼓掌欢呼， 但中国却会因此失去俄罗斯这个伙伴，而且，用不了多久，美国就会调转头来对付中国。拜登政府对华政策是只要不发生战争，就放手进行“极限竞争”。
显然，乌克兰冲突对中国的利益，包括“一带一路”倡议的欧洲部分，都造成了巨大损害。但是北京同情莫斯科的说法，即冲突的根源是北约在苏联解体之后无休止的东扩。自戈尔巴乔夫以来，所有俄罗斯领导人都在警告这种扩张的后果。俄罗斯感到他无法容忍其乌克兰兄弟离开俄罗斯世界而加入到另外一个阵营。如果北约在俄罗斯看来像一个弗兰肯斯坦的怪物，到处张牙舞爪，那么，普京就可能认为他必须斩妖除魔。
欧洲的未来不难猜测。普京针对乌克兰的全面战争已经失败。恰恰因为如此，他必须要一直打下去，直到宣布某种胜利。这可能包括乌克兰要接受克里米亚是俄罗斯的一部分，承诺不加入北约以及承认顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克两个“共和国”的独立。挑战在于，俄军在占领顿巴斯后能否守得住它。
虽然不能肯定，但俄乌战争很可能走向旷日持久。这种情况有点类似苏联80年代入侵阿富汗后，美国所率领的联军向阿富汗的圣战民兵源源不断地提供武器，最终消耗、拖垮了苏军。
一个已经“脑死亡”的北约因危机再次复活。今年2月，德国总理舒尔茨设立了一个1000亿欧元的防务基金，并宣布德国将从今年开始，按照北约要求将每年GDP的2%用于防务。这将加强北约并充实欧洲“战略自主”。迄今为止，“战略自主”仅仅是法国的一个口号而已。
讽刺的是，北约越受欢迎，欧洲越不安全。如果芬兰真的加入北约，那么北约的军队将距圣彼得堡仅一箭之遥。克里姆林宫已经警告，此举将会终结“波罗的海无核地位”，这有可能是虚张声势，但谁知道呢？如果北约最担心的莫过于俄罗斯使用战术核武器发动进攻，为什么要不断挑衅，去戳普京的眼睛呢？欧洲只有一如既往同俄罗斯合作，才有可能安全。
最近几个月，对中俄伙伴关系的猜测甚嚣尘上。原因是普京2月来华出席冬奥会时双方宣布中俄友好“没有止境”，外界猜测中俄会因此缔结军事联盟。但是乌克兰战争恰好证明，北京和莫斯科之间的友谊不是军事联盟。中国并没有向俄罗斯提供军事援助，相反，中国两次向乌克兰提供了包括食品和睡袋等人道主义援助和善款，并承诺将继续“发挥建设性的作用”。
中俄不结盟的一个原因是，它使两个伙伴之间有舒适的灵活度。尽管中俄都呼吁多极化，但是因为他们对这个世界的看法不尽相同，彼此不结盟最好。普京领导下的俄罗斯怀念苏联帝国的昔日荣光，普京本人曾经悲叹苏联的解体是“20世纪最大的地缘政治灾难”。俄罗斯认为它是现有国际秩序的受害者。相比之下，中国是二战之后西方建立的全球贸易金融规章制度的最大受益者，因此捍卫现有的国际秩序对中国利益攸关。这也是为什么，尽管有意识形态上的分歧，有时甚至关系紧张，中国和西方最起码保持了强劲的经济往来，双方都不愿意割舍这种关系。
美国如何能够同时应付印太地区和欧洲战场有待观察。拜登曾经希望能够让美国对俄政策“稳定、可测”，这样，美国就可以专注其印太战略。乌克兰的战争毫无疑问分散了美国的注意力和资源，将进一步使拜登的印太战略空心化。印太战略目标很多，但手段很少，而且支持者寥寥。乌克兰会在多大程度上使拜登分心尚不清楚。在本地区，中国是大多数国家的最大贸易伙伴，甚至美国最好的盟友也不愿意为了美国的利益而牺牲同中国的双边关系。
俄乌战争是不是世界陷入新的无序的转折点？据说，中国总理周恩来在被问到如何看待1789年法国大革命时说，现在下结论为时过早。但现在说一句“乌克兰战争加速了世界地缘政治和经济由西向东转移的趋势”也许不算为时过早。中国屹立于中央，举足轻重。它应站稳立场，成为世界的稳定之源。
翻译：韩桦
Senior Colonel Zhou Bo says the war in Ukraine will accelerate the geopolitical shift from West to East
If the enemy of my enemy is my friend, is the enemy of my friend also my enemy? Not necessarily. Or so China’s thinking goes when it comes to the raging Russian-Ukranian war. On the one hand China is Russia’s strategic partner. On the other, China is the largest trading partner of Ukraine. Beijing therefore tries painstakingly to strike a balance in its responses to the war between two of its friends. It expresses understanding of Russia’s “legitimate concerns” over NATO’s expansion, while underlining that “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected”.
Such carefully calibrated neutrality may not be what the warring parties really want, but it is acceptable to both. If China joins the West in condemning Russia, it will be much applauded in Washington and most European capitals. But it will lose Russia’s partnership. And it is only a matter of time before America takes on China again. The Biden administration’s policy towards my country is “extreme competition” that stops just short of war.
Obviously, the confict in Ukraine has done tremendous damage to Chinese interests, including its Belt and Road initiative in Europe. But Beijing sympathises with Moscow’s claim that the root cause of the confict is NATO’s inexorable expansion eastward after the fall of the Soviet Union. All Russian leaders since Mikhail Gorbachev have warned of the consequences of such expansion. Russia feels that it cannot allow its Ukrainian brethren to leave Russkiy mir—the Russian world—to join another camp. If NATO looks like Frankenstein’s monster to Russia, with new additions here and there, Vladimir Putin probably believes he must slay the creature.
The future of Europe is not hard to fathom. Mr Putin’s all-out war against Ukraine has failed. Precisely because of that, he will fight until he can declare some sort of “victory”. Presumably this will involve Ukraine’s acceptance that Crimea is part of Russia, its promise not to join NATO and the independence of the two “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. The challenge is whether Russian troops are able to control Donbas after occupying it.
A protracted war looks probable, if not inevitable. The situation bears similarities to the one in Afghanistan during Russia’s war there in the 1980s. An American-led alliance sent endless weapons to the mujahideen who managed to bog down and exhaust the invading Soviet soldiers.
Thanks to the crisis, a brain-dead NATO has revived. In February Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, created a special €100bn ($105bn) fund for defence and announced that his country would spend 2% of its GDP on defence every year—a NATO guideline. It will beef up the alliance and bolster the idea of European “strategic autonomy” (little more than a French slogan until now).
The irony is that the more popular NATO becomes, the more insecure Europe will be. If Finland joins NATO, as looks likely, the alliance’s troops would be a stone’s throw from St Petersburg. The Kremlin has warned that such a move would end the “non-nuclear status of the Baltic Sea”. This could be a bluff. But who knows? If NATO’s worst fear is that Russia might launch a tactical nuclear attack, then why keep poking Mr Putin in the eyes? Europe’s security, now as in the past, can only be achieved with Russia’s co-operation.
In recent months speculation abounded that Beijing and Moscow’s “unlimited” partnership—announced during Mr Putin’s visit to China in February for the Winter Olympics—might usher in a military alliance. But the war in Ukraine has inadvertently proved that Beijing and Moscow’s rapprochement is not an alliance. China didn’t provide military assistance to Russia. Instead it provided humanitarian aid and money to Ukraine twice, including food and sleeping bags, and has pledged to continue to “play a constructive role”.
One reason behind the Sino-Russian non-alliance is that it allows a comfortable flexibility between two partners. And in spite of the fact that China and Russia both call for a multipolar world, a non-alliance suits them because they see such a world differently. Mr Putin’s Russia is nostalgic for the heyday of the Soviet empire. (He lamented its demise as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.) Russia sees itself as a victim of the existing international order. By contrast China is the largest beneficiary of the rules and regulations of global commerce and finance made by the West after the second world war. China has a huge stake in safeguarding the existing international order. This is why, despite ideological differences and even tensions sometimes, China has at least maintained robust economic ties with the West. Neither side wishes to sever them.
How America can focus simultaneously on two theatres—the Indo-Pacifc and war in Europe—remains to be seen. Joe Biden had hoped to put Russia policy on a “stable and predictable” footing in order to focus on America’s Indo-Pacifc strategy. The war in Ukraine undoubtedly will distract America’s attention and syphon away resources. It will further hollow out Mr Biden’s Indo-Pacifc strategy, which already has too many aims and too few tools and not enough supporters. The question is for how long Mr Biden will allow Ukraine to remain a distraction. In a region where China is the largest trading partner of most countries, even America’s greatest allies wouldn’t wish to sacrifice their relationship with China for the benefit of America.
Is the Russia-Ukraine war a turning point that heralds new global disorder? Rumor has it that when China’s Premier Zhou Enlai was asked what he thought of the French Revolution of 1789, he supposedly said that it was too early to tell. But perhaps it isn’t too early to say that the war in Ukraine will accelerate the geopolitical and economic shift from the West to the East. China standing in the centre matters all the more, and it should stand firm as a stabiliser.
（Senior Colonel Zhou Bo is a retired officer of the People’s Liberation Army and a senior fellow at the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, Beijing and a China Forum expert.）
本文首发于2022年5月11日观察者网
