编者按：8月17日，美国商务部公布针对华为的新一轮制裁措施，重点限制美国以外企业获取美国软件设计的芯片，企图全面切断华为芯片供应链。在此之前，白宫还试图清除美国网络中的中国应用和电信公司。美国政府的一系列“数字炮舰”政策阻碍正常的商业和技术合作，不符合国际社会的共同利益，受伤的绝不仅仅是中国一方。
一、特朗普政府打压TikTok和微信，将使互联网进一步碎片化，还可能引起反制，甚至导致贸易战。越南和土耳其等国已经重新审视自己对美国科技提供商的依赖，收紧对美国社交媒体的控制。潘多拉的盒子一旦打开，美国要做好自食苦果的准备。
1. The shift could hurt American internet giants like Facebook and Google, which have greatly benefited from the borderless digital terroir outside China, as well as Chinese internet giants like Tencent and Alibaba, which have tried to expand into the West.
If more countries follow Mr. Trump by basing digital controls on diplomatic allegiances, protectionist aims or new concerns about the security of their citizens, the internet could become more of a patchwork of fiefs as varied as the visa policies that fragment world travel.
As the Trump administration cracks down on TikTok and WeChat, other nations may start to see their dependence on U.S. technology providers in a different light. Already, Vietnam and Turkey have tightened control over American social media. (August, 19. 2020, The New York Times, Trump’s Attacks on TikTok and WeChat Could Further Fracture the Internet）
2. In reality, banning is more likely to increase — not reduce — risk, because it builds up distrust among countries and companies. Other countries may retaliate by banning U.S. companies and the situation could rapidly spiral.
The abuse of “national security threat” is snowballing and leading to an escalating trade war that could disrupt world trade. We saw a similar situation caused by the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs in the 1930s. The goal was to protect U.S. farmers and other industries that were suffering during the Great Depression by raising tariffs and discouraging import of products from other countries. But, not surprisingly, almost all of the U.S. trade partners retaliated and raised their tariffs. That resulted in U.S. imports decreasing 66% and exports decreasing 61% making the “Great Depression” much greater. In general, there are rarely winners in trade wars, and probably not in cyber trade wars. (August 28, 2020, Harvard Business Review Home, TheTikTok Ban Should Worry Every Company)
二、美国政府实行双重标准，一方面，找借口限制中国社交软件；另一方面，特朗普政府仍在通过反对其他国家监管数字经济的做法，为美国科技巨头争取利益。
Elsewhere, the Trump administration is still pushing for a more open internet and fighting for the interests of its tech giants by opposing other countries’ efforts to regulate their digital economies.
This includes an offensive against new or proposed digital services taxes in countries including France, Britain, Italy and India, which would fall heavily on Google and Amazon. The administration has also objected to European efforts to address privacy concerns by blocking the flow of consumer data to the United States. (August, 19, 2020, The New York Times, Trump’s Attacks on TikTok and WeChat Could Further Fracture the Internet)
三、美国想通过阻挠他国技术发展来确保其在科技领域的领先地位，而不是在研发上下功夫，这是不现实的。
Restricting China’s access to technology—for example, computer chips built by foreign foundries using American equipment—will slow China only temporarily. Huawei may not be able to fabricate chips in Taiwan, but it can hire anyone who’ll work for it, and about 10% of Taiwan’s chip engineers are now working in mainland China to build up Beijing’s domestic semiconductor industry. The U.S. still leads in chip-making equipment, but American machines are neither indispensable nor the most advanced in the key area of lithography.
(July, 24, 2020, The Wall Street Journal, What China Learned From Cold War America)
四、美国一系列针对中国的“技术墙”也将许多其他国家拖入泥沼。华为同几乎所有欧盟国家都有正在进行中的电信设备相关合同，若华为因美国的绞杀无法按期交付产品，它的欧洲客户们将要承受巨大的经济损失。与中美皆有合作的澳大利亚研究型大学、国防工业、商业和政府机构的活动也将受到美国扩大出口管制改革的严重影响。
1. The U.S.'s latest salvo against Huawei is creating headaches for European telecom operators locked into contracts with the Chinese telecom giant.
The rule, which entered into force on Thursday，could jeopardize Europe's own telecom networks, potentially ramping up costs and creating delays to the deployment of the bloc's 5G networks.
Huawei said "it's still too early to determine what, if any, impact this will have on our supply chain," but warned that "ultimately it is Europe's and the world's consumers who will suffer" due to U.S. attempts to thwart the company.
For now, European operators still rely heavily on Huawei for its existing 4G networks. A recent market analysis by Strand Consulting estimated that Huawei has ongoing contracts to provide telecom gear in all but one EU country, Slovakia. That means Europe has a lot to lose. (August, 25, 2020, POLITICO, Europe’s 5G plans in limbo after latest salvo against Huawei)
2. Australia is particularly exposed to this transformation. Australian research universities — often collaborating with both US and Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises and defence companies — could face significant disruption and limitation in who they partner with, how they structure their laboratories and the way they source funding. In terms of national security, Australia will face growing pressure from the United States to go further in protecting IP, particularly if Canberra continues to seek greater access to and collaboration with America’s defence industrial base. Lastly, the largely open and laissez-faire way Australia has structured and invested in its science, technology and innovation ecosystem over the past decades will no longer suffice in a more competitive world. (June, 16, 2020, United States Studies Center, Tech Wars: US-China Technology Competition and What It Means for Australia)
五、美国半导体行业协会会长兼首席执行官约John Neuffer表示，对中国的非敏感性商业产品的销售推动了美国半导体行业的研究和创新；美国对华为的新一轮制裁“将给该行业带来重大破坏”。欧洲芯片生产商也将受到负面影响。
John Neuffer, the president and chief executive officer of the U.S.’s Semiconductor Industry Association, said the rule “will bring significant disruption” to the sector.
“We are surprised and concerned by the administration’s sudden shift from its prior support of a more narrow approach intended to achieve stated national-security goals while limiting harm to U.S. companies,” Neuffer said in a statement. “We reiterate our view that sales of non-sensitive, commercial products to China drive semiconductor research and innovation here in the U.S., which is critical to America’s economic strength and national security.
The latest U.S. restrictions on Huawei are negative for European chipmakers, JPMorgan Chase & Co. analysts said in a note, adding that a key risk for firms such as STMicroelectronics, AMS AG and Dialog Semiconductor PLC is Chinese retaliatory restrictions on major customer Apple Inc. (August, 18, 2020, Bloomberg, U.S. Announces New Curbs on Huawei Access to U.S. Technology)
六、事实上，对于一个国家的安全至关重要的只有部分网络安全问题，必须逆转目前过分强调网络安全问题的风气。尽管大国竞争日益盛行，但任何国家都不会从大规模网络攻击中受益。有必要继续努力建立网络空间国际规则，以减少国家间的相互猜疑和不必要的危机升级。
However, such a securitization of all cybersecurity concerns does more harm than good to a country’s interests. In fact, only some ICT-related cyber issues are critical to national security.
As there are no physical boundaries in cyberspace, countries should employ a combination of domestic measures and joint international efforts to address cyber threats. At the domestic level, countries must reverse their current policies of securitizing all cyber concerns. On the contrary, governments can take steps to identify which core national security interests are most vulnerable to cyber attacks. However, in other areas, where threats caused by the use of ICT are not critical to core national security interests, it is more feasible and cost effective to enhance malware detection and prevention as well as improve the resilience of networks, rather than trying to eliminate cyber attacks completely, as there is no perfect environment in which all malicious cyber activities can be fully eradicated.
On the global stage, it is essential for the international community to share information to improve situational awareness and exchange best practices to improve the overall defensive capabilities of state actors. It is also necessary to continue efforts to establish norms to decrease suspicion between countries and avoid the unnecessary escalation of crises in cyberspace. Despite the growing prevalence of great power competition, it is still possible for countries to build confidence in each other. No country benefits from suffering a large-scale cyber attack, the effects of which always spill over from their intended targets. In some instances, the attackers themselves may even suffer adverse effects from their own actions. (August, 25, 2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, What Is the U.S. Ban on TikTok and WeChat All About?
