编者按：11月24日，清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员、中国论坛特约专家周波应邀在英国伦敦国王学院就乌克兰危机、欧洲安全及中国立场发表演讲，并现场回答了有关问题。

周波：感谢著名的伦敦国王学院（King's College London） 邀请，让我就乌克兰危机与各位进行交流。这本来是一场正在欧洲心脏进行的战争，让我惊讶的是，中国的角色和作用却被反复谈及。大家有期望，也有误解。我想，我被邀请到国王学院来就这个问题与大家讨论，恰恰说明在英国，大家都希望对中国的立场进一步了解。

关于乌克兰危机，首先我要说的是，中国对战争爆发完全不知情，但中国对这场战争的忧虑并不比英国少，为什么？因为战争严重影响了中国在欧洲的利益，破坏了中国在欧洲的投资，损害了“一带一路”倡议在欧洲的发展建设。更糟糕的是，中国中立公正的立场在相当程度上被许多欧洲国家误解，造成关系紧张。在美国激化与中国竞争的时候，中国最不想要的就是与欧洲各国关系恶化。如果欧洲不总是站在美国这边，这对我们来讲非常重要。

为什么中国在乌克兰危机问题上不选边站队？正如我在《经济学人》杂志上写道的，如果敌人的敌人是我的朋友，那么朋友的敌人也是我的敌人吗？不见得。但是，不选边站队其实非常不容易，一方面中国是俄罗斯的战略伙伴，另一方面中国是乌克兰的最大贸易伙伴，因此我们极力在我们两个朋友之间的战争中，寻求公正平衡，甚至连普京总统也说，他理解中国对于这场战争有自己的疑问和担忧。中国理解俄罗斯对北约扩张的合理关切，同时也强调所有国家的主权和领土完整都必须得到尊重。尊重主权和领土完整就不消多说了，我要特别强调的一点就是，其实从苏联领导人到俄罗斯领导人，也就是从戈尔巴乔夫、叶利钦到普京，都是明确反对北约东扩的。普京的不同在于，他把这种口头的反对化为了军事行动。

超过4000名北约士兵驻扎在爱沙尼亚、立陶宛和拉脱维亚等东欧国家（图源：Al Jazeera）

中国的不偏不倚是这两个国家最需要的吗？当然不是，但这一立场对双方来说都是可以接受的。要是中国与西方一起谴责俄罗斯，那当然美国和大部分欧洲国家都会鼓掌欢呼，但是中国会因此失去俄罗斯这个伙伴，而且用不了多久，美国就会掉头来对付中国，中国对此十分清醒。

外界对中俄战略伙伴关系最大的误解，是因为我们说过两国友好没有止境，就广泛推测中俄为结盟关系，但是乌克兰危机恰好证明，中国和俄罗斯之间的友谊不是军事联盟，因为中国并没向俄罗斯提供军事援助，相反，我们至少两次向乌克兰提供了食品、睡袋等人道主义援助和善款。中俄不结盟的原因之一是，尽管中俄都呼吁世界多极化，但是我们对这个世界的看法不尽相同。普京领导下的俄罗斯，怀念苏联帝国的昔日荣光，普京本人曾经哀叹，苏联的解体是20世纪最大的地缘政治灾难，俄罗斯认为它是现有国际秩序的受害者。

相比之下，中国是二战之后以西方为主建立的全球贸易、金融体系的受益者，也是全球化的最大受益者，因此愿意捍卫现有的国际秩序，这也是为什么中国和西方尽管有意识形态上的分歧，甚至有时双方关系比较紧张，但是最起码保持了强劲的经济往来，双方都不愿意割舍这种关系。

关于欧洲的未来，普京有一点说的对，这不是俄罗斯与乌克兰的战争，而是俄罗斯与西方的战争，换句话说，这是俄罗斯与北约30个国家之间的战争。现在西方正在源源不断地向乌克兰提供武器，这让我想起80年代，苏军在阿富汗被美国支持的阿富汗圣战民兵消耗拖垮。但是这次不太可能，俄罗斯在自己的家门口外作战，享有地理之便。

欧洲的安全困境在于：北约越受欢迎，欧洲就越不安全。所有的军事联盟都像蚂蝗吸血一样依附“威胁”而活，北约希望通过扩张保持活力，但是它的扩张把欧洲逼到了核威胁的门槛边。欧洲的安全实际上就是北约如何同俄罗斯就势力范围相互妥协的事情。“势力范围”这个词摆不到台面上，但如果俄罗斯认为有势力范围并愿意为之使用武力，那么就真有势力范围。

乌克兰危机一眼看不到尽头。可能的结果之一是10年之后，欧洲的战略自主初现端倪。迄今为止，“战略自主”只是法国总统马克龙的一个口号而已。受乌克兰危机的刺激，从今年开始，德国每年将把GDP的2%用于军队建设，军费投入上达到北约标准，德国总理舒尔茨还宣布设立1000亿欧元的国防特别基金，力度空前。所以，10年后德国武装力量可能会成为欧洲最强大的军队，这会刺激英法加强军队建设。那么，欧洲战略自主会加强北约还是削弱北约？我很愿意倾听大家的看法。

欧洲国家普遍担心俄罗斯在战争中使用核武器。10月27日我在英国《金融时报》发表文章提出，中国应该明确反对俄罗斯在战场上使用核武器，因为这将违背联合国五个常任理事国今年一月发表的联合声明，即核战争打不赢也打不得。俄罗斯使用核武器还将致中国于非常困难的境地，因为中国半个多世纪以来就一直奉行不首先使用核武器的政策。中国的核政策是所有核武器国家中最透明，最持续和最稳定的。

我感到非常高兴的是，在文章发表的第二天，普京总统在瓦尔代会议上表示，俄罗斯不打算使用核武器，当然他的态度之前有过反复。11月4日，德国总理舒尔茨访问中国，习主席向他表明了国际社会应该共同反对使用或威胁使用核武器，倡导核武器用不得、核战争打不得，防止亚欧大陆出现核危机。舒尔茨表示，即便只有这一个共识，他的访华就是值得的。习主席在印尼巴厘岛G20会议上同拜登谈话的时候，再次强调了中国在核问题上的立场，这是中美目前很难得的重要共识。

那么，如何解决欧洲的安全困境呢？目前看来，没有任何一种方案能够完完全全满足欧洲的安全需求，因此我个人认为战火硝烟还会弥漫一段时间，大家才会真的愿意坐下来谈判。对此，我有三个建议：第一步，北约应该单方面承诺不首先对俄罗斯使用核武器；其次，北约应该停止扩张，来换取俄罗斯不首先使用核武器；第三步就是北约削减庞大的常规武器数量，来换取俄罗斯削减其最大的核武器的数量。这三个建议其实每一条做起来都不太容易，但我认为它是平衡的，对双方的关切都有所关照。

最后再说几句关于未来的世界秩序。我认为，乌克兰危机将使俄罗斯的国力和全球影响力大大衰落，但同时，西方民主在全球的影响力也会继续下降。按照美国“自由之家”的统计数据，西方民主已经连续衰退了15年，今后还会加速衰退。按照慕尼黑安全会议的报告，不仅全球正变得“去西方化”，就连西方也正在变得“去西方化”。这可是西方自己的统计和结论。

我进一步认为，世界地缘政治和经济正加速向东转移。这不仅仅是因为中国的崛起，也是因为印度和东盟等实力上升造成的集体崛起。大家对“自由国际秩序”耳熟能详，但我认为不仅将来，就连过去也根本没有这种秩序，这是西方的自恋和臆造。

诚然，许多规则、制度，甚至像国际货币基金组织和世界银行这样的机构都是西方在二战后打造的，但仅仅这些并不能定义国际秩序。战后国际秩序也被风起云涌的非洲独立运动、冷战、苏联解体和中国崛起等重大事件塑造。国际秩序还包括不同的宗教、文化、习俗、民族特性和社会制度，其中一些可能已经存续千年之久。当今国际秩序还受到全球化、气候变化、大流行病和核扩散的影响。事实上，看似最接近自由国际秩序的时期是苏联解体后，中国还没有完全崛起的15年左右。然而区区15年在人类历史上不过是弹指一挥间。

如果没有自由国际秩序，当然就没有什么“民主对专制”之说。根据《经济学人》智库发布的2021年“民主指数”，在总共167个国家和地区中，只有21个被认为是完全的“民主国家”，仅占世界人口的6.4％。“自由国际秩序”不能解释的是，如果“自由民主”模式站在了道德的制高点上，为什么它在全球都衰退呢？

它不能解释为什么像印度这样的民主国家被认为变得越来越专制；不能解释为什么由中国和俄罗斯这两个所谓“威权国家”领导的上海合作组织正在发展壮大，甚至吸引了土耳其这个北约国家；不能解释为什么美国前总统特朗普要煽动暴民占领美国民主的最高殿堂国会山；不能解释为什么中国在保有自己的社会制度的同时，已经与世界其他地区紧密相连，成为全球130个国家的最大贸易伙伴国。

中国和美国不是敌人，中国也不是欧洲的的系统性对手。乌克兰危机告诉我们一个常识——无论我们有多么不同，我们必须共存。

（本文2022年11月30日首发于“观察者网”）

Zhou Bo: What the Crisis in Ukraine Reveals

On November 24, Zhou Bo, a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert, was invited to give a speech and respond to a live Q&A on the Ukraine Crisis, European security, and China’s position.
Zhou Bo：I would like to thank the prestigious King's College London for inviting me to discuss the Ukraine Crisis with all of you. This is  a war waged in the heart of Europe, but to my surprise, China’s position and role in this crisis has been mentioned repeatedly. People have expectations but also misunderstandings. I think my invitation to discuss this matter at King’s College London reveals the eagerness everyone has to learn more about China’s position in this crisis.
The first thing I want to say about the Ukraine Crisis is that China was completely unaware there would be an outbreak of the war, but China is no less concerned about this war than the United Kingdom. Why? Because the war has seriously harmed China’s interests and investments in Europe, as well as impaired the development of the Belt and Road Initiative on the continent. To make matters worse, China's neutral and impartial stance has led to a considerable degree of misinterpretation and misunderstanding by many European nations, causing tensions in China’s international relations. At a time when the US is intensifying its competition with China, the last thing China wants is a deterioration in its relations with European countries. It is very important to us that Europe is not always on the side of the United States.
Why is China not taking sides in the Ukraine Crisis? As I have written in The Economist, if the enemy of my enemy is my friend, is the enemy of my friend my enemy? Not necessarily. However, it is not easy not to choose sides. On the one hand, China is Russia’s strategic partner, and on the other hand, China is Ukraine’s largest trading partner. Therefore, we are trying our best to find a fair balance in this war between our two friends; even President Putin has said that he understands China has its own concerns about the war. China understands Russia's legitimate concerns about NATO expansion, but at the same time also emphasizes that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected. There is no need to say more about respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. But I want to emphasize that, from the leaders of the Soviet Union to the leaders of Russia—that is, from Gorbachev to Yeltsin to Putin—there has always been a clear opposition NATO's eastward expansion. Putin's difference is that he translated this verbal opposition into military action.
Is China's neutrality what these two countries need most? Of course not, but this position is acceptable to both parties. If China joins the West in condemning Russia, then of course the United States and most European countries will applaud and cheer, but China will lose Russia as a partner, and it will not be long before the United States will turn around and deal with China. China is very aware of this.
The biggest misunderstanding others have about the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is that, because we once have said that the friendship between the two countries has no end, it is widely speculated that China and Russia have an alliance. However, the Ukraine Crisis proves that the friendship between China and Russia is not a military alliance, because instead of providing military aid to Russia, China has on the contrary provided food, sleeping bags, and other types of humanitarian assistance and donations to Ukraine at least twice. One of the reasons for the non-alignment between China and Russia is that although both countries call for a multipolar world, we have different views of this world. Russia, under the leadership of Putin, misses the heydays of the Soviet Empire. Putin himself once lamented that the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century, and Russia considers itself a victim of the existing international order.
By contrast, China is the beneficiary of the postwar western-led international trade and financial system and the biggest beneficiary of globalization. As a result, China is willing to defend the existing international order. This is why China and the West, despite their ideological differences and occasional tense relations, have at the very least maintained strong economic exchanges, with neither side willing to sever this relationship.
Regarding the future of Europe, Putin is right about one thing: This is not a war between Russia and Ukraine, but a war between Russia and the West. In other words, it is a war between Russia and the 30 NATO member states. Now that the West is continuously supplying weapons to Ukraine, this reminds me of the 1980s, when the Soviet army in Afghanistan was worn down by the American-backed Afghan mujahideen. But such a result is unlikely this time, as Russia enjoys the geographical convenience of fighting just outside its own home.
Europe's security dilemma lies in this: the more popular NATO becomes, the less secure Europe becomes. All military alliances rely on “threats” to survive like leeches relying on blood. NATO hopes to maintain its vitality through expansion, but its expansion has pushed Europe onto the brink of nuclear threats. European security is actually a matter of how NATO and Russia compromise on their spheres of influence. The term "spheres of influence" may not seem attractive, but if Russia believes it has a sphere of influence and is willing to use force to secure it, then spheres of influence truly do exist.
There is currently no end in sight to the Ukraine Crisis. One possible outcome is that a decade later, European strategic autonomy will begin to emerge. Thus far, "strategic autonomy" is only a slogan used by French President Macron. Starting this year, propelled by the crisis in Ukraine, Germany aims to spend 2% of its GDP on building its military every year, meeting the military expenditure target set out by NATO. German Chancellor Schulz also announced the unprecedented establishment of a special defense fund of 100 billion Euros. Therefore, will European strategic autonomy strengthen or weaken NATO? I look forward to hearing everyone's thoughts.
European countries are generally concerned about Russia's use of nuclear weapons in this war. As I pointed out in my article in The Financial Times published on October 27, China should clearly oppose Russia's use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, as this violates the joint statement issued by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in January this year, which states that a nuclear war cannot be won and cannot be fought. Russia's use of nuclear weapons would also pose a very difficult situation for China, as China has maintained a no-first-use policy for more than half a century. China's nuclear policy is the most transparent, consistent, and stable of all nuclear-weapon states.
I am very happy that on the second day after the article was published, President Putin stated at the Valdai Club Meeting that Russia does not intend to use nuclear weapons. Of course, his attitude has been repeated before. On November 4, when German Chancellor Schulz visited China, President Xi informed him that the international community should jointly oppose the use or the threat to use nuclear weapons, advocate for nuclear weapons to not be used and for nuclear wars to not be fought, and prevent a nuclear crisis on the Eurasian continent. In response, Schultz stated that his visit to China is worthwhile if only for this consensus. When President Xi met with President Biden at the G20 meeting in Bali, Indonesia, he once again emphasized China's position on the nuclear issue. This is an important and rare consensus between China and the United States.
So, how can Europe's security dilemma be solved? Thus far, no one solution can completely satisfy the security needs of Europe, so I personally think that the flames of war will linger for a while longer before everyone is truly willing to sit down and negotiate. In this regard, I have three suggestions: first, NATO should unilaterally promise not to use nuclear weapons first against Russia; second, NATO should stop its expansion in exchange for Russia’s promise of not using nuclear weapons; third, NATO should reduce its vast amount of conventional weapons in exchange for Russia’s reduction of its nuclear weapons. Even though each of the three suggestions is not easy to implement, I believe these suggestions are balanced and address the concerns of both parties involved.
Lastly, I will say a few final words about the future world order. I believe that the Ukraine Crisis will greatly weaken Russia's national power and global influence. But at the same time, the influence of Western democracy in the world will also continue to decline. According to data from the United States’ Freedom House, Western democracy has been in decline for 15 consecutive years, and such decline will accelerate in the future. According to the report from the Munich Security Conference, not only is the world becoming "less western ", even the West is becoming "less western ." These are the West's own statistics and conclusions.
I would further argue that global geopolitics and economics are shifting eastward at an accelerated pace. This is not only because of the rise of China but also due to the rise of India and ASEAN. Everyone is familiar with the "liberal international order," but I do not think there will be such an order in the future, nor was there such an order in the past. This term reflects the narcissism and fabrication of the West.
To be sure, many rules and institutions such as the IMF and World Bank were created by the West after World War II, but these alone do not define the international order. The post-war international order was also shaped by major events such as decolonial independence movements in Africa, the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the rise of China. The international order includes different religions, cultures, customs, national identities, and social institutions, some of which may have existed for thousands of years. Today's international order is also shaped by globalization, climate change, pandemics, and nuclear proliferation. In fact, the period that seems closest to resembling a liberal international order is the 15 or so years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, before China fully emerged. However, a mere 15 years is but a blink of an eye in human history.
If there was not a liberal international order, there of course would not exist discourse such as "democracy versus autocracy." According to the 2021 "Democracy Index" released by the Economist Intelligence Unit, out of a total of 167 countries and regions, only 21 are considered to be fully "democratic countries," accounting for only 6.4% of the world's population. The "liberal international order" cannot explain why it is on global decline, if the "liberal democracy" model indeed stands on such moral high ground?
It also does not explain why democracies such as India are seen as becoming increasingly authoritarian; it does not explain why the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, led by so-called "authoritarian" China and Russia, is growing successfully and even attracting Turkey, a NATO member state; it cannot explain why former U.S. President Trump wants to incite mobs to occupy Capitol Hill, the beacon of American democracy; it cannot explain why China, having maintained its own social system, is already 130 countries’ largest trading partner and closely connected with the rest of the world.
China and the United States are not enemies, and China is not Europe’s systematic rival. The Ukraine Crisis informed us of a common consensus--we must coexist despite our differences.

Speech delivered at King’s College, London, on Nov. 24, 2022.

This article was first published on China-US Focus on Dec 14, 2022.