赵华胜：复旦大学国际问题研究院教授、中国论坛特约专家
虽然新冠疫情对国际政治和世界经济带来强大冲击，但对欧亚一体化来说，这种冲击的影响并不十分明显。疫情没有使欧亚一体化退出地区的议事日程，但也没有给它提供新的特别动力。欧亚一体化所面临的挑战依旧，它的发展和突破主要取决于它能否解决一系列“传统的”制约性问题。
△图片来源：瓦尔代官网
多元化还是碎片化？
欧亚一体化只有共同的名称，但没有共同的机制。它不是单一的地区合作机制或项目，更确切说，它是一个由诸多不同的国家战略、区域组织、合作机制构成的过程，这其中最主要的有上合组织、欧亚经济联盟、一带一路、大欧亚伙伴关系、带盟对接、中亚一体化、突厥语国家一体化，等等。它们都是欧亚一体化的一部分，但也都不代表着整个的欧亚一体化。这形成了欧亚一体化在概念、结构、机制上的多样性和多元化。
欧亚一体化的多样性和多元化是欧亚地区复杂的国家、历史、文化构成的自然反映，它们都有形成的合理性，它们的目标都是推进相关国家间的合作，也都在不同程度和范围上推动着欧亚区域合作。
不过，问题在于，在一定程度上，它们也造成欧亚地区的次区域之间在意识和机制上的分割，如果它们相互造成限制和封闭，则对整体的或更大范围的区域合作形成制约。
上合组织是这一地区唯一的全区域性地区组织，它的八个正式成员和四个观察员国包括了这一地区的主要国家，它的范围覆盖了欧亚、中亚、南亚以及西亚的大部分地区。可以说，上合组织连接了欧亚地区的主要次地区，具有最广泛的代表性，如果欧亚一体化需要一个共同的平台，上合组织是最合适的。
中国对推动以上合组织为框架的区域合作最为积极，2003年中国就提出了建立上合组织自贸区的建议，并倡议成立上合组织发展银行。但迄今为止，上合组织在推进形成区域一体化机制方面未取得突破。
欧亚经济联盟达到了区域一体化的较高层次，在推动欧亚一体化方面最为成功。不过，欧亚经济联盟的成员都是前苏联共和国，这使它的成员需要有特定的政治背景，这限制了它成为欧亚一体化大框架可能。欧亚经济联盟主要通过与其他经济体建立自贸区来扩大合作范围，它已与越南、伊朗、塞尔维亚、新加坡签署了自贸区协议，并正在与埃及、以色列、印度就建立自贸区进行谈判。欧亚经济联盟虽与中国发展经贸合作，但对与中国建立自贸区态度谨慎。
中亚五国从独立之初做过多次一体化的尝试，也曾成立过中亚联盟，中亚经济共同体和中亚合作组织。虽然通过了许多文件，也制定了具体目标，但成果甚微。在2005年中亚合作组织并入欧亚经济共同体后，中亚五国的一体化销声匿迹。2016年米尔济约耶夫就任乌兹别克斯坦总统后，推动了中亚一体化的重新启动。2018年和2019年，五国元首已经就中亚国家一体化举行了两次协商会晤。未来这一过程还会继续。中亚国家有着密切的地理、历史、民族、宗教俄联系，并且有着许多共同的问题和关切，因此一体化有着自然的需要和基础。目前还难以确定中亚一体化会发展到什么程度。不过，由于它基本是在中亚地区，因此它只限于欧亚地区的次区域合作。
中亚国家一体化本身是合理的，但不能不看到的是美国有利用中亚国家一体化达到使中亚国家与俄罗斯和中国分离的目的。从美国的大中亚计划到“新丝绸之路战略”，以至到现在的印太战略，美国都不掩饰它的这一目的。也就是说，美国对中亚国家一体化的鼓励不仅仅是为了中亚，也带有地缘政治目的，这客观上为欧亚一体化制造了障碍。
突厥语国家合作委员会在2015年提出制订突厥语世界一体化概念，并在2018年通过了突厥语世界一体化文件。突厥语国家合作委员会的成员是土耳其、阿塞拜疆、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦，另外还有匈牙利为观察员国。土库曼斯坦暂未加入。突厥语国家都是欧亚国家，其中中亚国家又占多数，因此突厥语世界一体化也是欧亚一体化的一部分。它以语言文化上的亲近为一体化的纽带，这既是它的优势，也是它的限制，在中亚它不能把讲波斯语的塔吉克斯坦包括在内，在高加索它也不能把非突厥语系的格鲁吉亚和亚美尼亚包括在内，因此它扩大为更大的区域合作机制的空间很小。而且，它的一体化程度越高，这些国家在经济上的限制就越大。
中俄在欧亚地区都有各自的区域一体化构想和战略。中俄都是大国，它们都在欧亚地区有着重大利益。作为大国，有更大的对地区责任的自觉意识，也更习惯从欧亚地区整体的视野看待这一区域。
2013年，中国提出了“一带一路”倡议。“一带一路”倡议包括了上合组织的范围，也包括了大欧亚地区。这一倡议使中国不必完全依赖上合组织的平台推动区域一体化，并且可以自主和自由地选择一体化的方向和形式。
俄罗斯在2016年提出了大欧亚伙伴关系。它最初是普京总统在2016年6月的圣彼得堡经济论坛上提出的，并在2016年的国情咨文中确定。在一定意义上，大欧亚伙伴关系也是对中国的一带一路概念的回应，俄罗斯希望拿出自己的区域大战略概念。大欧亚概念使俄罗斯迈出了传统的欧亚范围即原苏联地区，在战略构想上走向大欧亚，包括东欧、亚太和印度洋地区。
欧亚地区一体化机制和形式的多样性是一个独特的现象，这是由于欧亚地区复杂的政治、历史、地理、文化等原因造成的。它们有存在的合理性，符合相关国家的利益，但需要防止的是碎片化，即缺乏相互协调甚至成为相互限制的因素。次区域一体化机制在推动各自一体化的同时，对于更大范围或大欧亚地区一体化不一定产生推动作用。它们之中一些机制是封闭或半封闭的，它们不是对地区所有国家开放，在不能同步或协调发展的情况下，它们相互也可能变成对对方的某种限制，对非成员国与成员国双边经济关系的发展也会产生影响。
政治思维和经济逻辑
在欧亚一体化中，政治思维和经济逻辑都是重要的推动力量，但政治思维和经济逻辑有时会发生矛盾，制约了欧亚一体化的发展。欧亚一体化之所以难以取得突破性发展，这也是重要原因之一。
这特别表现在中俄关系中。中俄是欧亚一体化的两个最主要的国家，没有中俄的一体化，所谓欧亚一体化是不可能的。从1996年“上海五国”开始，中俄在中亚和欧亚地区就是合作伙伴。在过去的20多年里，一直有中俄在中亚将发生冲突的各种预测和评论，例如为了争夺中亚资源的冲突，为了争夺对中亚影响力的冲突等等，但这种冲突从没有发生过，两国在整体上始终保持着合作关系。
不过，对于欧亚一体化，由于中俄的历史背景和位置不一样，两国的思维方式不同。具体说，中国重经济和经济思维，俄罗斯重政治和政治思维。
中国对于欧亚一体化没有政治上的顾虑，它是把欧亚一体化作为一个经济项目来做，完全是从经济思维出发，主张最大程度地减小阻碍经济一体化的各种障碍，降低经济合作成本，实现资源的最优配置，提高欧亚区域经济合作的水平。俄罗斯当然也重视欧亚一体化的经济意义，但它首先把它看成一个政治项目。像历史上的任何帝国一样，俄罗斯也会有“帝国综合征”，俄罗斯是把原苏联地区看作自己的影响范围，在政治心理上，对其他大国进入这一地区特别敏感，特别是难以接受它们的影响超过俄罗斯。对中国也是一样，俄罗斯有一种矛盾的心理：一方面愿意与中国合作，也理解中俄在欧亚需要合作；另一方面，又不希望看到中国在这一地区的存在过深。这就使得俄罗斯在与中国的欧亚一体化合作上一边踩着油门，一边又踩着刹车。从经济思维的角度，应当全速推动，但从政治思维的角度，又要限制速度。因此，俄罗斯对与中国在欧亚地区深度的经济一体化比较谨慎，这是上合组织区域经济合作迟滞的原因之一，也是欧亚经济联盟可以与其他国家建立自贸区、但却不与中国进行自贸区谈判的原因之一。
中国超比例的庞大经济体量既是欧亚一体化的主要动力和资源，同时也给其他国家造成压力，包括俄罗斯。因此，俄罗斯一方面要与中国共同推动欧亚一体化，另一方面也希望能对中国有所平衡，避免这个地区被一个国家主导。这是所有处于这种情况下的大国都会有的自然想法。俄罗斯积极主张上合组织扩大，接受印度为正式成员，其中也有能在上合组织内部结构上平衡中国的因素。扩大增加了上合组织的地缘政治分量，但由于成员的增加和地域的扩大，上合组织区域经济一体化的难度更大了，效率也更难提高。俄罗斯的大欧亚伙伴关系也有通过发展与东南亚、东北亚和南亚的关系来使欧亚地区的政治经济结构更平衡的含义，当然这不是唯一的目标。
需要新的途径
区域一体化本身不是目的，它的目的是优化区域的资源配置，推动区域经济社会的发展。欧亚一体化也是如此。
由于欧亚地区条件独特，欧亚国家政治文化不同，宗教信仰多样，经济发展程度差异巨大，因此形成整体的欧亚一体化的机制极为困难。
欧亚一体化不可避免地会存在多样化和多层次的形式。在这其中，丝绸之路经济带与欧亚经济联盟的对接占有特别地位，可以说这是在目前所有的欧亚一体化的形式中最直接的途径。它的优点在于，它与上合组织不同，它没有那么多主体，上合组织是八个主体，要达成一致不仅十分困难，而且成本很高。带盟对接是两个主体，谈判对象清楚。带盟对接的关键国家是中国和俄罗斯，因此，带盟对接的推进就是中俄一体化的推进，在相当大程度上也可以代表着欧亚一体化的推进。在现今的形势下，有理由把带盟对接作为欧亚一体化的主要发展路径。
中俄在2015年发表了专门的联合声明，宣布实行丝绸之路经济带和欧亚经济联盟对接战略，可见中俄对此的重视。迄今为止，中国与欧亚经济联盟已经举行了六轮带盟对接会晤，但还没有突破性进展。
带盟的对接，或者说中俄的欧亚一体化，不单纯是经济合作问题，它也是战略和政治关系问题。没有中俄战略合作的深化，中俄的欧亚一体化是不可能的。因此，带盟的对接需要政治和经济合作的同步发展，相互促进，要在政治思维上实现突破。
带盟对接不仅要以利益平衡为基础，不仅要从经济角度考虑问题，而且要解决各自特别关切和担心的问题。只有去除或缓解了对一体化可能对本国经济带来的消极后果的担心，并且看到一体化能够带来的经济上的利益，才能愿意推动一体化。
产业链建设可以成为推动欧亚一体化的重要途径。新冠疫情暴发后，全球产业链受到严重破坏，显示了过长和过于复杂的产业链的脆弱性。中美等大国间政治关系的恶化也给全球产业链造成威胁。有理由相信，在疫情过后，全球产业链会发生某种程度的重组，各国将会更多注意减少它的脆弱性，全球产业链的区域性会得到加强。欧亚一体化应该利用这个机会，发展起更密切的区域性产业链，这可给欧亚国家带来稳定的经济和社会利益，也是促进区域一体化的重要动力。
欧亚一体化应突破传统的思路，以往欧亚一体化主要把它限制在经济领域，现在应扩大它的内容，把公共卫生和防止瘟疫、自然灾害、病虫害等作为欧亚一体化的重要内容。新冠疫情显示了这些领域对国家利益的重要性，欧亚国家地理上相邻，更需要加强在这些领域的合作。相对来说，这些非传统安全领域对各国的共同利益明显，更容易进行合作。这也应是欧亚一体化的重要方向。
附英文版：
Eurasian Integration: Adapting to New Realities
By Zhao Huasheng
Political thinking and economic logics are both serve as important driving forces for Eurasian integration, but sometimes they contradict each other, which restricts the Eurasian integration from going forward quickly. This is also one of the important reasons why it is difficult for the Eurasian integration to achieve a major breakthrough, writes Zhao Huasheng, China Forum Expert, Professor at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University.
COVID-19 has had a formidable impact on international politics and the world economy, but the epidemic has neither put Eurasian integration off the region’s agenda, nor given it a new impetus. However, Eurasian integration still faces challenges as before, and its development and potential for breakthroughs mainly depend on whether it can resolve a series of “traditional” constraints.
Diversification or Fragmentation?
Eurasian integration has a common name but no common mechanism.
It is not a single regional project or mechanism for cooperation; more precisely, it is a process made up of many different strategies, regional organisations, cooperation mechanisms, and initiatives, such as the SCO, the Eurasian Economic Union, OBOR, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, the Central Asian integration process, the Turkic-speaking countries’ cooperation committee, and so on. They are all aspects of Eurasian integration, but no single one of them represents the entirety of Eurasian integration. This has resulted in Eurasian integration entailing a diverse array of concepts, structures and mechanisms.
The diversity of Eurasian integration is a natural reflection of the complex national, historical and cultural composition of the Eurasian region. All of the relevant countries aim to promote mutual cooperation, and by doing so contribute to regional integration in Eurasia to varying degrees.
The problem is, however, that under certain circumstances, if they are confining and isolating each other, it could also possibly lead to the institutional fragmentation of the sub-regions of the Eurasian region, which restricts regional cooperation as a whole or on a larger scale.
The SCO is the only region-wide organisation in the region. It includes eight full member states and four observer states, which are the major countries of the region, covering most of Eurasia, Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia.
It can be said that the SCO connects the major sub-regions of the Eurasian region and has the broadest representation. If Eurasian integration requires a common platform, the SCO is the most suitable one.
China has been most active in advocating regional integration using the framework of the SCO. As early as in 2003, China proposed establishing the SCO free trade zone and setting up the SCO development bank. But up to now, the SCO has not made a breakthrough in the formation of regional integration mechanisms. The creation of the SCO bank is still in flux.
The EEU has reached a higher level of regional integration and has been the most successful organisation in pursuing Eurasian integration. However, the membership of the EEU is so far limited to former Soviet republics, and requires its members to have specific political backgrounds, which limits its potential as a broad framework for Eurasian integration. The EEU has expanded its scope of cooperation mainly by establishing free trade zones with other economies. It has signed agreements with Vietnam, Iran, Serbia and Singapore, and is in talks with Egypt, Israel and India to establish free trade zones. However, it is very cautious about the establishment of a free trade zone with China, its largest trading partner.
The five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan) have made many integration attempts since immediately after gaining independence. They set up the Central Asian Union, Central Asian Economic Community and Central Asian Cooperation Organisation. Although many documents were adopted and specific targets were set, little was achieved.
In 2005, after the Central Asia Cooperation Organisation merged into the Eurasian Economic Community, the first phase of integration of the five Central Asian countries ceased.
Since taking office as Uzbekistan’s President in 2016, President Mirziyoyev has activated a new stage of Central Asian integration. In 2018 and 2019, the five heads of the Central Asian states held two consultative meetings on Central Asian integration. The Central Asian countries have very close geographical, historical, ethnic and religious ties and share many common problems and concerns, so integration has a natural need to fulfil. It is still difficult to determine how far Central Asian integration will go. However, while it is essential in the Central Asia region, it is limited to a sub-regional scope in the Eurasia region.
The integration of Central Asian countries itself is reasonable, but one fact should be recognised: that the United States intends to use the integration of these countries to drive a wedge between the group and both Russia and China. It could be observed in the greater Central Asia plan, a well-circulated idea of the United States after the Afghanistan war, the New Silk Road Strategy of the United States of 2011, and the current Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States has made it no secret that, by encouraging the integration of Central Asian countries, it is pursuing its own geopolitical purposes. Objectively, it could add geopolitical elements to Central Asian integration, which isn’t desired.
In 2015 the Turkic Speaking Countries Cooperation Committee proposed the concept of Turkic world integration and adopted a relative document in 2018. The Turkic Speaking Countries Cooperation Committee has five members, namely, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with Hungary as an observer state. Turkmenistan is the only Turkic-speaking state that has not joined.
Turkic-speaking countries are all Eurasian countries; the majority are in Central Asia. Therefore, Turkic-speaking world integration can also be considered Eurasian integration. The ties cited as a basis for the integration of Turkic-speaking states are language and culture, which is both an advantage and a limitation. The group does not include Persian-speaking Tajikistan in Central Asia, or Georgia and Armenia in the Caucasus, so it’s impossible for the group to expand into a greater regional cooperation mechanism.
Both China and Russia have their own designs and strategies for regional integration in the Eurasian region. China and Russia are both big countries with key interests in Eurasia. As major countries, they have a greater sense of regional responsibility and are more accustomed to maintaining an overarching perspective when viewing the region.
In 2013, China put forward the One Belt One Road initiative. The OBOR initiative covers the SCO as well as greater Eurasian region. This initiative enables China to choose the directions and forms of regional integration independently and freely, alongside the platform of the SCO.
Russian President Putin first proposed the Greater Eurasian Partnership at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2016 and confirmed it in his State Address the same year. By putting forward the concept of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, Russia wants to come up with its own grand strategic regional concept, which Russia currently lacks. The concept of the Greater Eurasia Partnership enables Russia to step beyond the traditional Eurasian area, namely the former Soviet Union, and move towards a greater Eurasia, which would include Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific region and Indian Ocean region, with its own integration platform.
The diversity of integration mechanisms and forms in Eurasia is a unique phenomenon, which is caused by the complicated politics, histories, geography and culture of the Eurasia region. Diversified forms of integration are best suited to the reality of the Eurasian region. However, what needs to be avoided is fragmentation, that is, the lack of mutual coordination or even becoming a mutual limiting factor. Some of these mechanisms are closed or semi-closed, they are not open to all countries in the region, and, in the absence of coordinated development, could create certain shared restrictions affecting the development of bilateral economic relations between member states and no-member states. A large number of integration mechanisms could enhance economic relations in sub-regions, but it does not necessarily promote the more large-scale integration of the greater Eurasia region.
Political Thinking and Economic Logics
Political thinking and economic logic both serve as important driving forces for Eurasian integration, but sometimes they contradict each other, which restricts Eurasian integration from going forward more quickly. This is also one of the important reasons why it is difficult for Eurasian integration to achieve a major breakthrough.
This is particularly true in relations between China and Russia, the two most important countries pursuing Eurasian integration, without which so-called Eurasian integration is impossible.
Over the past 20 years, there have been various predictions and comments regarding conflicts between China and Russia in Central Asia, such as conflicts over resources in Central Asia, conflicts over competition for influence in Central Asia and so on. However, such conflicts have failed to occur. China and Russia have been pursuing cooperation in Central Asia and Eurasia since formation of the “Shanghai Five” in 1996, the year both countries declared a strategic partnership, and the two countries have maintained cooperative relations since then.
But due to their different historical backgrounds and economic positions, China and Russia have different ways of thinking about Eurasian integration. Specifically, China attaches more importance to the economy and economic thinking, while Russia attaches more importance to politics and political thinking.
China sees Eurasian integration first of all as an economic project, motivated mainly by economic logic. China has been actively advocating a reduction of barriers to economic integration, lower the cost of economic cooperation, to achieve the most economically rational allocation of resources, to make full use of complementary economic structures, and to create favourable conditions for regional economic cooperation and integration.
While Russia values the economic importance of Eurasian integration, it sees it as a political project as well. Like any empire in history, Russia has been suffering from “empire syndrome” since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia regards the former Soviet Union as its sphere of influence, and is politically and psychologically sensitive to the entry of other powers into the region, especially when the influence of these great powers is likely to surpass that of Russia.
The same is true for China. Russia has experiencing an ambivalence in its attitudes towards China in Eurasian integration. On the one hand, Russia recognises the importance and necessity of cooperating with China, and it is willing to promote Eurasian integration jointly with China. On the other hand, it does not want to see China’s presence in the region become too deep. This has left Russia both on the accelerator and the brake in its cooperation with China in promoting Eurasian integration. From an economic point of view, Russia likes push ahead at full speed, but from a political point of view, Russia purposely limits the speed.
Russia, therefore, maintains a very cautious position towards deeper economic integration with China in Eurasia. It is one of the reasons why economic cooperation in the SCO region has lagged, and why the EEU has been able to establish free trade zones with other countries, but China is not included.
China’s disproportionately large economy is an important driver and resource for Eurasian integration, but it also puts pressure on other countries, including Russia. It is another major problem for China’s partners in Eurasian integration. It raises understandable concern in Russia that deep, unchecked integration with China could place Russia in an unfavourable economic position and give China an overwhelming role, allowing Chinese goods to dominate the markets of Russia. Thus, it’s in Russia’s interest to pursue a balance with China, to prevent the region from being dominated by one country.
This is one reason why Russia had actively advocated the membership of India in the SCO. Enlargement has increased the geopolitical weight of the SCO, but this increase in the number of its member states and geographical expansion has made the SCO’s regional economic integration even more difficult. Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership also aims at making the political and economic structure of Eurasia more balanced by developing relations with Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia. Though this is not the only goal.
New Paths Are Needed
Regional integration is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to optimise regional resource allocation and promote regional economic and social development. The same is true of Eurasian integration.
Unlike Europe, the Eurasian countries differ greatly in their political cultures and religious beliefs, and their economic development gap is huge. Due to these unique conditions, it is extremely difficult to form an overall mechanism for Eurasian integration.
So, it is inevitable that integration in Eurasia will take many forms. But in all these forms, the one that affects Eurasian integration most is the connection between the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). If Eurasian integration could make a breakthrough, it is the most likely breakthrough point.
China and Russia are the major countries in the SREB-EEU connection. Therefore, in some sense, it is the integration between China and Russia, and to a large extent the progress of the SREB-EEU connection will also represents the advancement of Eurasian integration. Its advantage is that, unlike the SCO, it does not have as many bodies. The SCO has eight bodies, and reaching agreement is not only difficult but also costly. The SREB and EEU project is between two parties, and the objects of negotiation are clear.
China and Russia issued a special joint statement, announcing the implementation of the strategy of linking the SREB with the EEU, which shows that China and Russia attach great importance to this. So far, China and the EEU have held six rounds of meetings and certain progress has been achieved, but no breakthrough has been made.
The alignment of the SREB and EEU is not only a question of economic cooperation, but it concerns a mutual strategic and political understanding between China and Russia as well. Without the deepening of this strategic mutual understanding between the two countries, a breakthrough in integration between China and Russia is unthinkable. Therefore, it requires the simultaneous development of political and economic cooperation.
A breakthrough in the connection of the SREB and EEU can only be achieved with a change of political thinking, through the balancing of economic benefits, and through the mitigation of the related concerns of each side. Only by removing or alleviating concerns about the negative consequences integration might have for the national economy, and by appreciating the economic benefits that integration can bring will they be willing to promote deep integration.
Building new industrial value chains can become an important way to promote Eurasian integration. The COVID-19 outbreak has been damaging global industrial value chains severely, revealing the vulnerability of overly long and overly complex industrial value chains. The deterioration of political relations between major countries such as China and the United States also poses a threat to global industrial value chains.
There is reason to believe that the global industrial value chains will undergo some restructuring after the pandemic. Countries will pay more attention to reducing their vulnerability, and the regional nature of the global industrial value chains will be strengthened. Promoters of Eurasian integration should take this opportunity to develop closer regional industrial value chains, which will bring stable economic and social benefits to Eurasian countries and serve as an important driving force for regional integration.
Eurasian integration should increase its paths so as to provide more sources of power to keep the process going forward. One possible area of cooperation is public health, the prevention of contagious diseases, and the elimination of the consequences of natural disasters, plant diseases and pest control. It’s not a quick fix, limited to the outbreak of COVID-19, but a long-term development need. The geographical proximity of the Eurasian countries makes it even more necessary to strengthen cooperation in these areas. These non-traditional security areas have obvious common interests, making mutual cooperation relatively easy. We’re used to thinking of these fields as resource-consuming, but in fact they have great industrial, scientific and technological value, and could create enormous economic benefits. It could also be a new approach to Eurasian integration.
英文版于2020年7月16日首发于瓦尔代官方网站
