SUN Chenghao, Fellow, Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University

The Asia-Pacific region is of immense geopolitical significance, serving as a hub for global trade, commerce, and strategic interests. Given the increasing influence of countries like China and the rapid economic growth of several Southeast Asian nations, the U.S. strategy in this region has far-reaching implications for regional stability and security.

In this regard, Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) brings to your attention the views of Fellow Sun Chenghao from the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University to evaluate the U.S.’s strategic approach in the Asia-Pacific.

1. What kind of alliance system/strategy does the U.S.A. follow to maintain the balance of powers in Asia?

As Chinese scholars, we have long believed that the United States has adopted a hub-and-spoke model of alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, where the U.S. forms a comprehensive alliance in the region through bilateral alliances with different countries. For example, the U.S. maintains close bilateral military relationships with allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, while cooperation among these allies is relatively loose, with the U.S. at the core. Loose here refers to cooperation among these allies, not between these allies and the US.

However, I believe that there have been some changes in the form of the U.S. alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, especially in the period from the Trump administration to the current Biden administration. It has shifted from the previously clear hub-and-spoke model to a more issue-driven alliance, or it has not yet found a clearer new model. Therefore, the alliance involves multiple actors, driven mainly by specific issues. As a result, most Chinese scholars prefer to refer to this model as an alliance-and-partner system rather than describing it solely as an alliance system.

For example, in addressing military security issues, to jointly respond to challenges on the Korean Peninsula, the Biden administration held a trilateral summit with the United States, Japan, and South Korea in 2023, and the trilateral alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea will gradually form in the future. I believe that the Biden administration is trying to mediate between Japan and South Korea in order to form a stronger trilateral alliance. In particular, when we consider the historical and territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea, the Biden administration seems to have tried to resolve this issue.

Biden administration also found that they need an economic pillar to support their allies or partners in the Asia-Pacific region as they believe that even though they are militarily stronger than China in this region, on economic and trade issues regional countries are more inclined to support China, which makes them in need of accommodating economic pillar to support their allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region. In terms of supply chains or broader economic and trade issues, the Biden administration has promoted the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which is not a simple alliance since it also involves partner countries such as India, as India is not a de facto alliance of the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. alliance system and strategy in the region are no longer as clear-cut as before. They have some gray zones, and there is some functional cooperation among allies and partners, which makes the form of the alliance and partner system issue driven. This issue-driven alliance and partner system will be more flexible, but certainty and cohesion may decrease as a result.

2. How should the U.S. establish a balance in its Asia policy to guarantee both the autonomy of its allies and leverage to shape allied decision-making?

I personally believe that the United States doesn’t place much emphasis on the autonomy of its allies, and it even prefers them to have limited autonomy, for two reasons:

Firstly, many of America’s allies in the Asia-Pacific region lack sufficient autonomy. Countries like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines all face this issue. For example, Japan and South Korea are heavily reliant on the United States for military support. While Japan has long sought to become a normal military power, it remains restricted due to post-World War II limitations. South Korea perceives a threat from DPRK and relies on the U.S. to maintain its security. The Philippines believes it needs U.S. assistance to address China’s actions in the South China Sea. I believe that the U.S. and Philippines have some coordination because the Philippines is the military ally of the U.S. If the Philippines has any direct military conflict with China, the U.S. will be dragged into the conflict because of the alliance commitment. If these countries cannot exercise autonomy in fundamental security matters, their autonomy is greatly diminished.

Secondly, the United States isn’t inclined to grant autonomy to its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. On the one hand, there remains a traditional alliance security dilemma between the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. worries that its allies may take incorrect policy decisions when faced with threats or pressure, and if conflict arises, it could drag the U.S. into an unnecessary disaster. Therefore, the U.S. must strive to avoid such a scenario by limiting the autonomy of their allies.

On the other hand, the U.S. is actively implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy, redirecting high-quality resources to the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, the U.S. hopes to lead the security and economic development of the Asia-Pacific region, and it expects its allies to contribute to the Indo-Pacific strategy by implementing policies favorable to the Washington. If allies were to have autonomy, the U.S. is also concerned that they might deviate from its strategic trajectory.

3. To what extent should the United States calibrate its military presence within the Asia-Pacific region to effectively balance strategic interests, regional stability imperatives, and evolving geopolitical dynamics?

I believe that the United States must first recognize the experiences and patterns of development in the Asia-Pacific region. The development and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region over the past few decades have not been built on the military strength of any single country, especially not on the maintenance of order by any regional superpower. From the post-World War II era to the Cold War period, the Asia-Pacific region was often at the forefront of conflict and confrontation, overshadowed by the war. The people of the Asia-Pacific region have also suffered greatly from wars and colonialism, all of which are painful historical lessons for the region. After the end of the Cold War, countries in the Asia-Pacific region, based on the theme of peace and development, have continuously sought cooperation, promoting sustained and rapid economic growth in the region, making it the most dynamic region in the global economy.

The United States should recognize that this region cannot become a battleground for great power rivalry, nor should any form of military conflict occur. It is essential to jointly adhere to the agenda of cooperation and development. Under this premise, we can understand the need for the United States to ensure its own and its allies’ security. However, the Indo-Pacific strategy should not be simply interpreted as a transfer of military resources to the region; otherwise, it will only provoke panic among regional countries, exacerbate security dilemmas, and turn regional conflicts into a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, ASEAN countries are not so strong in terms of military domains. They are trying to have some economic and political cooperation like the EU. Therefore, I believe that the U.S. should be concerned about turning regional conflict into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Logic of the U.S. is that the China is becoming a big power, and it is taking so called coercive actions towards other regional countries, and that will bring conflicts. However, if the U.S. comes back with more military powers, it will turn possible regional conflicts into a self-fulfilling prophecy, as everyone will feel insecure in this region.

Furthermore, the successful implementation of an Indo-Pacific strategy by the United States is inseparable from a successful China strategy. If the U.S. wants to have a successful Indo-Pacific strategy, it should have a successful China strategy taking into account China’s presence in the region. Therefore, viewing China as a strategic competitor and increasing pressure on China in the military security domain will only make the relationship between the two countries and the regional dynamics more unstable. According to this, I believe that this approach does not align with America’s strategic interests in the region.