On March 29 and 30, 2019, the Center for International Strategy and Security of Tsinghua University (CISS) and the National Institute for South China Sea Studies jointly held a closed-door symposium on the topic of  “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security: Cooperation, Order and Rules” in Boao, Hainan, bringing together intellectuals from China, the US, Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam. It is the first academic conference on the South China Sea issue with the presence of Chinese, US and ASEAN scholars, aiming to clarify the concerns of all parties involved and the complex picture in the South China Sea. This symposium focuses on the status quo of the South China Sea issue as well as its solutions.

I. Arguments of Chinese Scholars

1. There are two contradictions in the South China Sea issue: one concerns the division between China and ASEAN claimants, which essentially involves disputes over territorial sovereignty, maritime delimitation and maritime jurisdiction; the other concerns the disagreements between China and US, representing frictions of strategic interests and geopolitical conflicts and involving tensions between China’s endeavors to safeguard its sovereignty, national interests and a strategic position which suits its security interests and the US efforts to maintain its dominance in the Asia-Pacific region.

2. The division between China and ASEAN claimants over the South China Sea issue has been remarkably eased over the last two years, moving the situation in a positive direction. Against the backdrop of improved China-Philippines relations, further consultation on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea and deeper China-ASEAN maritime cooperation, the situation in the South China Sea is evolving positively, yet with certain fluctuations. Nevertheless, in the long run, it is still necessary to unswervingly expand positive aspects in maritime cooperation and establish sound confidence building measures, so as to develop a long-term mechanism for regional security dialogue and cooperation and improve Asia-Pacific security principles and framework.

3. The freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) of the US military has added uncertainties in the South China Sea and superjacent airspace. Since May 2017, the US warships and airplanes, in the name of FONOPs, have entered Chinese territorial scope around Xisha and Nansha Islands for multiple times — 15 times publicly — which has severely threatened China’s national security. Meanwhile, far from being called up, the US military’s FONOPs in the region are increasingly normalized and institutionalized, and its ships has been sailing within 12 miles of Chinese islands more frequently. Over time, the possibility of encounters between Chinese and US warships and airplanes in the South China Sea and superjacent airspace will increase, making it more difficult to put things under control, which can possibly cause low-intensity military frictions and even partial conflicts. Therefore, both sides should not persist in mutual finger-pointing blindly, but step back from speculation and judgment about the other’s strategic intentions and figure out constructive solutions to conflicting interests of the two sides through meaningful dialogue.

II. Major Arguments of Scholars from ASEAN Countries

1. The COC is of constructive significance for the region’s security order. The COC consultation is considered the beginning of attempts to establish “a rules-based order” in the South China Sea, aiming to restrain and guide countries in the region so that they can safeguard their own interests, attend to others’ concerns and peacefully solve disputes in an inclusive manner. Meanwhile, an agreement over the COC can help ASEAN countries to exert a greater impact on major-country competition and China to improve its regional and international image and show its willingness to respect the rules. The COC should become an example in peacefully settling disputes through dialogue and negotiation for the reference of regions and countries.

2. Southeast Asian countries wish to understand their role in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Some scholars criticize the US for being overly assertive and aggressive, running FONOPs in the South China Sea without adequate backing of international law and failing to strictly meet the innocent passage requirements. Other scholars are worried that the ASEAN-centered regional architecture, which was born out of years of efforts, would be rendered unfeasible. Philippine scholars argue that though the Philippines is a US ally, it may not necessarily choose the US when having to take sides. At present, China and the Philippines are on pretty good terms, and the latter has quite high economic expectations on China. Meanwhile, the US needs to clarify some security issues, such as whether the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applies to conflicts between the Philippines and any other country over sovereignty disputes of islands.

3. There are opportunities for technical cooperation between China and ASEAN. ASEAN attaches great importance to maritime cooperation, and its internal and external cooperation mechanisms have been continuously improved, with quite a few overlaps. Both China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the US Indo-Pacific Strategy have urged ASEAN to pay more attention to and engage in regional maritime cooperation. Meanwhile, this region has a lot of challenges which require collective response, including navigation safety, pirates, maritime terrorism, human trafficking, prevention of and response to natural disasters, and protection of marine ecosystems. They are all associated with maritime security and sustainable development and call for cooperation of parties involved.

III. Arguments of US Scholars

1. The US would be unlikely to reduce the frequency of FONOPs. As one of the major ways for the US to maintain its military presence in the South China Sea, FONOPs are aimed at showing Washington’s disagreement against Beijing’s maritime claims in the region. The South China Sea issue has become a symbol of China-US rivalry, and where it is going will affect the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region. What the China-US military competition in the South China Sea will evolve is still a question. It can either escalate into head-on confrontations or lead to dialogue and coordination. The two countries must engage in direct and meaningful dialogue, exchange their views of demilitarization in sensitive areas, and make clear their own bottom line and room for maneuver. If no restrictions were imposed on the trend of militarization, the situation would be quite dangerous.

2. An agreement between China and the US is just as important as that between China and ASEAN countries. Some scholars hold that even though China and ASEAN reach an agreement on the COC, it is still questionable whether the code is enforceable and whether all parties involved can faithfully observe. In addition, given that each party has its self-interest, some of the US scholars do not believe that the COC will be established in three years.

IV. Some Consensual Recommendations

1. To create a favorable environment for cooperation and promote understanding and stability through cooperation. In the current phase, the China-ASEAN cooperation should prioritize protection of marine ecosystems and joint exploitation of resources. The South China Sea coastal states can establish a common fishing moratorium, negotiate on bilateral and multi-lateral fishing treaties, jointly exploit and develop undersea natural gas, conduct joint maritime law enforcement and administration, etc.

2. To make clear the priorities in cooperation on maritime security in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific region. The focus should be placed on three areas at the initial stage: first, to exchange important information and experience in regional security governance; second, to establish confidence-building measures based on bilateral treaties and multi-lateral legal frameworks like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; third, to boost capacity building by enhancing cooperation between maritime law enforcement agencies.

3. To discuss the idea of the “rules-based international order”. The “rules-based order” is a conception which can be accepted by all parties to varying degrees, or at least one which no party would speak out against. To establish such an order is an idea in reginal and global security governance which is acceptable to all parties, including China and the US. It would be great if we can have thorough and profound discussions, clarify basic principles and design a roadmap from a technical perspective, as the process itself can boost mutual understanding and trust and is important in building a regional security framework in the future. The parties involved may enhance dialogue and communication on this basis, strive to establish a set of common security principles and then develop key elements in the order, in a bid to build a foundation for gradually setting up a new-type regional security framework which features inclusiveness, openness and peaceful coexistence.

4. To play down strategic competition in regional affairs. Despite the structural contradictions between China and the US in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific, there are still possibilities for consultations and cooperation. The first priority is to cautiously handle disputes over rules and strategic frictions concerning the South China Sea issue and enhance capabilities to control risks and address crises. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy should downplay its role as a military alliance, focus more on economic competition, and even evolve into an economic alliance which China can join. In this way, the strategy may help control the rise of antagonism in two countries and, not impossibly, converge with the BRI for a middle ground. For example, as the beforehand research of some large projects in the BRI has not been conducted sufficiently, China can engage US consultancies, which boast rich experience in this regard, to participate in such projects.

Appendix: List of attendees

Chinese scholars:

Fu Ying 

Director of the Center for International Strategy and Security, Tsinghua University

Yan Xuetong 

Director of the Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University

Yao Yunzhu 

Senior Advisor to the China Association of Military Science and retired Major General of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Wu Shicun 

President of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies

Zhu Feng

Executive Director General of the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University

Zhou Bo

Director General of the Center for Security Cooperation at the Office for International Military Cooperation in the Ministry of National Defense

Hu Bo

Director General of the Center for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University

Yi Xianhe

Chief expert and professor in international law of the China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies and the Institute of International Law, Wuhan University

Zhao Xiaozhuo

Director of the Beijing Xiangshan Forum Secretariat

Foreign scholars:

Richard Weitz

Director and Senior Fellow of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute

Michael D. Swaine

Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Huang Jing

Dean and Distinguished Professor of the Institute on National and Regional Studies, Beijing Language and Culture University

Michael Vatikiotis

Regional Director, Asia at the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue

Jusuf Wanandi 

Co-founder and Senior Fellow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia and council member of the China-Southeast Asia Research Center on the South China Sea

Kwa Chong Guan

Senior Fellow of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University and council member of the China-Southeast Asia Research Center on the South China Sea

Collin Koh Swee Lean

Research Fellow of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University